Log out Go to App
Go to App

Learning Materials

Features

Discover

Chapter 5: Q5. (page 114)

Does traditional one-person-one-vote (1p1v) majority voting allow voters to directly express differences in strengths of preference? Does quadratic voting do any better? Discuss the differences and then explain which system you prefer, and why.

Short Answer

Expert verified

No, the traditional one-person-one-vote does not allow the voters to directly express differences in strengths of preference.

Quadratic voting helps voters in expressing the strength of their preferences compared to one-person-one-vote.

Differences between quadratic and one-person-one-vote majority voting:

Quadratic Voting
One-person-one-vote Majority Voting
Express differences in strength of preference
Only reveals preference
Voters can buy votes according to their preference at the cost of the square to the number of votes purchased
No purchasing of votes
Considers marginal benefit analyses
No such consideration

The quadratic voting system will be preferred because it is more technical and efficient.

Step by step solution

01

Possibility of expressing the strength of preference in one-person-one-vote majority voting 

The traditional one-person-one-vote (1p1v) majority allows voters to reveal their preference in yes or no. It gives each individual a chance to express favor or disfavor for the public good. For example, one-person-one-vote majority voting for electing the representatives allows voters to express their consent for a particular candidate only once.

It does not allow voters to express the strength of their preference as one individual gets only one chance to express their preference in yes or no.

02

Expressing strength of preference in quadratic voting  

The quadratic voting comes into play for expressing the strength of preference. An individual can vote more than once to express their preference dominantly. The voters purchase votes according to their preference and cast their votes.

For example, the quadratic voting system for the selection of Senate bill 85 out of 107 bills in the legislative assembly of US allowed the members to cast nine votes on one bill and three votes on another bill or five votes each on four different bills.

03

Differences between traditional one-person-one-vote and quadratic voting

The following are the differences between the two types of voting:

  • The government decides for the winning side in majority voting, provided each voter can cast a vote only once to reveal his preference. In contrast, majority voting allows the voters to vote multiple times, showing the concentration of their votes.
  • In quadratic voting, people purchase extra votes to express the strength of their preference. The cost of each vote increases with the square of the number of votes. The majority voting does not include any such facility.
  • People purchase votes till the marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost. The majority voting does not take into account technicalities like marginal analyses.

The quadratic system is more technical as it considers marginal analyses for social benefit and allows the voters to express the strength of their preference, and there is less scope for inefficiencies. Therefore, you will prefer a quadratic voting system.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Start your free trial

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

We can apply voting paradoxes to the highway construction example of Table 5.2. Suppose there are only five people in a society, and each favors one of the five highway construction options listed in Table 5.2 (“No new construction” is one of the five options). Explain which of these highway options will be selected using a majority paired-choice vote. Will this option be the optimal size of the project from an economic perspective?

Plan
Total cost of project (\()
Marginal cost (\))
Total Benefit
Marginal Benefit
Net Benefit (TB-TC)
No new construction
0-0--
A: Widen existing highways
5050200200150
B: New 2-lane highways
14090350150210
C: New 4-lane highways
240100470120230
D: New 6-lane highways
620380580110-40

Political advertising is often directed at winning over so-called swing voters, whose votes might go either way. Suppose that two political parties—the Freedom Party and the Liberty Party—disagree on whether to build a new road. Polling shows that of 1,000 total voters, 450 are firmly for the new road and 450 are firmly against the new road. Thus, each party will try to win over a majority of the 100 remaining swing voters.

a. Suppose that each party spends $5,000 on untargeted TV, radio, and newspaper ads that are equally likely to reach any and all voters. How much per voter will be spent by both parties combined?

b. Suppose that, instead, each party could direct all of its spending toward just the swing voters by using targeted social media ads. If all of the two parties’ combined spending is targeted at just swing voters, how much will be spent per swing voter?

c. Suppose that only the Freedom Party knows how to target voters using social media. How much per swing voter will it be spending? If at the same time the Liberty Party is still using only untargeted TV, radio, and newspaper ads, what portion of its total spending is likely to be reaching the 100, swing voters? How much per swing voter does that portion amount to?

d. Looking at your answers to part c, how much more per swing voter will the Freedom Party be spending than the Liberty Party? If spending per swing voter influences elections, which party is more likely to win?

Explain how affirmative and negative majority votes can sometimes lead to inefficient allocations of resources to public goods. Use Figures 5.2a and 5.2b to show how society might be better off if Garcia were allowed to buy votes.

Draw a production possibilities curve with public goods on the vertical axis and private goods on the horizontal axis. Assuming the economy is initially operating on the curve, indicate how the production of public goods might be increased. How might the output of public goods be increased if the economy is initially operating at a point inside the curve?

Consider a corrupt provincial government in which each housing inspector examines two newly built structures each week. All the builders in the province are unethical and want to increase their profits by using substandard construction materials, but they can’t do that unless they can bribe a housing inspector into approving a substandard building.

a. If bribes cost \(1,000 each, how much will a housing inspector make each year in bribes? (Assume that each inspector works 52 weeks a year and gets bribed for every house he or she inspects.)

b. There is a provincial construction supervisor who gets to hire all of the housing inspectors. He himself is corrupt and expects his housing inspectors to share their bribes with him. Suppose that 20 inspectors work for him and that each passes along half the bribes collected from builders. How much will the construction supervisor collect each year?

c. Corrupt officials may have an incentive to reduce the provision of government services to help line their own pockets. Suppose that the provincial construction supervisor decides to cut the total number of housing inspectors from 20 to 10 in order to decrease the supply of new housing permits. This decrease in the supply of permits raises the equilibrium bribe from \)1,000 to \(2,500. How much per year will the construction supervisor now receive if he is still getting half of all the bribes collected by the 10 inspectors? How much more is the construction supervisor getting now than when he had 20 inspectors working in part b? Will he personally be happy with the reduction in government services?

d. What would happen if reducing the number of inspectors from 20 to 10 only increased the equilibrium bribe from \)1,000 to $1,500? In this case, how much per year would the construction supervisor collect from his 10 inspectors? How much less is the construction supervisor getting than when he had 20 inspectors working in part b? In this case, will the construction supervisor be happy with the reduction in government services? Will he want to go back to using 20 inspectors?
See all solutions

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free