The taxation of monopoly can sometimes produce results different from those that arise in the competitive case. This problem looks at some of those cases. Most of these can be analyzed by using the inverse elasticity rule (Equation 14.1 ). a. Consider first an ad valorem tax on the price of a monopoly's good. This tax reduces the net price received by the monopoly from \(P\) to \(P(1-t)-\) where \(t\) is the proportional tax rate. Show that, with a linear demand curve and constant marginal cost, the imposition of such a tax causes price to increase by less than the full extent of the tax. b. Suppose that the demand curve in part (a) were a constant elasticity curve. Show that the price would now increase by precisely the full extent of the tax. Explain the difference between these two cases. c. Describe a case where the imposition of an ad valorem tax on a monopoly would cause the price to increase by more than the tax. d. A specific tax is a fixed amount per unit of output. If the tax rate is \(\tau\) per unit, total tax collections are \(\tau Q .\) Show that the imposition of a specific tax on a monopoly will reduce output more (and increase price more) than will the imposition of an ad valorem tax that collects the same tax revenue.

Short Answer

Expert verified
In conclusion, the effects of ad valorem and specific taxes on monopolies depend on the underlying demand curve and its elasticity. In the case of a linear demand curve, the price increases due to ad valorem taxes are less than the full extent of the tax, while in the case of a constant elasticity demand curve, the price increase matches the tax. However, in special scenarios with highly elastic demand curves, ad valorem taxes can lead to price increases greater than the tax itself. Lastly, specific taxes tend to reduce output and increase price more than ad valorem taxes that collect the same revenue, because they are applied to the per-unit output and can result in higher marginal costs for the monopolist.

Step by step solution

01

a. Ad valorem tax on monopoly with linear demand curve

Let us consider a monopoly with a linear demand curve, \(Q = a - bP\). The marginal cost is constant and equal to \(c\). The monopolist's profit function can be written as: \[ \pi = (P(1-t) - c)Q \] Since the monopolist aims to maximize profit, we need to find the optimal price \(P^*\) that will maximize this expression. To do this, we'll first express the profit function in terms of \(Q\): \[ \pi = ((a/b - Q)(1-t) - c)Q\] Now, we'll differentiate the profit function with respect to \(Q\) and set the result equal to zero, then solve for \(Q\): \[ \frac{d \pi}{d Q} = (a/b - Q)(1-t) - c - Q(1-t) = 0\] \[ Q^* = \frac{a - c/b}{2 - t} \] That gives us the optimal quantity to maximize profits under the given ad valorem tax. Now, we can find the optimal price that corresponds to this optimal quantity using the demand function: \[ P^* = \frac{a - bQ^*}{b} \] \[ P^* = \frac{a - c}{2b - bt} \] Note how the tax \(t\) affects the optimal price. Since \(2b - bt > 2b\) when \(t > 0\), it means that the price increase due to the ad valorem tax is less than the full extent of the tax.
02

b. Ad valorem tax on monopoly with constant elasticity demand curve

Now, let us consider a monopoly with a constant elasticity demand curve, given by \(Q = A P^{\eta}\), where \(\eta\) is the elasticity of demand. Now, the profit function is given by: \[ \pi = (P(1-t) - c)Q \] \[ \pi = (P(1-t) - c)A P^{\eta} \] To maximize profits, we'll differentiate the profit function with respect to \(P\) and set the result equal to zero: \[ \frac{d \pi}{d P} = A (1-t) P^{\eta - 1} (\eta - 1 + \frac{c}{P(1-t)}) = 0\] Now, rearrange the equation to get the expression for the optimal price \(P^*\): \[ P^* = \frac{c}{(1-t)(\eta - 1)} \] This shows that the price increases by the full extent of the tax, since \(P^*\) is directly proportional to \(\frac{1}{1-t}\). As a result, when the demand curve has constant elasticity, the price increase will match the tax. The difference between these two cases lies in the shape of the demand curve. With a linear demand curve, the demand is less sensitive to price changes compared to a constant elasticity demand curve. In the latter case, a price increase due to the tax fully passes through to the consumers.
03

c. Ad valorem tax leading to a price increase larger than the tax

Consider a monopoly facing a demand curve that is very sensitive to price changes (i.e., highly elastic). In this case, the monopolist will try to minimize the impact of the tax on price while maintaining its market share. One potential scenario could be a luxury good, where consumers have many substitutes available and are highly responsive to changes in price. In order to maintain market share, the monopolist might attempt to maintain a low price, absorbing more of the tax itself. In this case, the imposition of an ad valorem tax could lead to price increases greater than the tax, as the monopolist tries to maintain a competitive position in the market.
04

d. Specific tax vs. ad valorem tax on monopoly

Let's analyze the effects of a specific tax and an ad valorem tax on the output and price of a monopoly. Suppose that the demand curve is given by \(Q = a - bP\) and the marginal cost is constant and equal to \(c\). For the specific tax case, the profit function is: \[ \pi_s = (P - c - \tau)Q \] To maximize profits, we can differentiate \(\pi_s\) with respect to \(Q\) and set the result equal to zero: \[ \frac{d \pi_s}{d Q} = (a/b - Q) - c - \tau = 0\] Now, for the ad valorem tax case, we have the following profit function (from part a): \[ \pi_v = (P(1-t) - c)Q \] Differentiating \(\pi_v\) with respect to \(Q\) and setting the result equal to zero: \[ \frac{d \pi_v}{d Q} = (a/b - Q)(1-t) - c = 0\] Comparing these two cases, we can see that the specific tax reduces output more and increases price more than an ad valorem tax that collects the same tax revenue. This is because specific taxes are applied to the per-unit output, leading to potentially higher marginal costs for the monopolist, whereas ad valorem taxes apply proportionally to the price.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose a perfectly competitive industry can produce widgets at a constant marginal cost of \(\$ 10\) per unit. Monopolized marginal costs increase to \(\$ 12\) per unit because \(\$ 2\) per unit must be paid to lobbyists to retain the widget producers' favored position. Suppose the market demand for widgets is given by \\[Q_{D}=1,000-50 P.\\] a. Calculate the perfectly competitive and monopoly outputs and prices. b. Calculate the total loss of consumer surplus from monopolization of widget production. c. Graph your results and explain how they differ from the usual analysis.

Suppose a monopoly market has a demand function in which quantity demanded depends not only on market price (P) but also on the amount of advertising the firm does ( \(A\), measured in dollars). The specific form of this function is \\[Q=(20-P)\left(1+0.1 A-0.01 A^{2}\right).\\] The monopolistic firm's cost function is given by \\[C=10 Q+15+A.\\] a. Suppose there is no advertising \((A=0) .\) What output will the profit- maximizing firm choose? What market price will this yield? What will be the monopoly's profits? b. Now let the firm also choose its optimal level of advertising expenditure. In this situation, what output level will be chosen? What price will this yield? What will the level of advertising be? What are the firm's profits in this case? Hint: This can be worked out most easily by assuming the monopoly chooses the profit-maximizing price rather than quantity.

Suppose a monopolist produces alkaline batteries that may have various useful lifetimes \((X) .\) Suppose also that consumers (inverse) demand depends on batteries' lifetimes and quantity (Q) purchased according to the function \\[P(Q, X)=g(X \cdot Q),\\] where \(g^{\prime} < 0 .\) That is, consumers care only about the product of quantity times lifetime: They are willing to pay equally for many short-lived batteries or few long-lived ones. Assume also that battery costs are given by \\[C(Q, X)=C(X) Q,\\] where \(C^{\prime}(X) > 0 .\) Show that, in this case, the monopoly will opt for the same level of \(X\) as does a competitive industry even though levels of output and prices may differ. Explain your result. Hint: Treat \(X Q\) as a composite commodity.

A monopolist faces a market demand curve given by \\[Q=70-p.\\] a. If the monopolist can produce at constant average and marginal costs of \(A C=M C=6,\) what output level will the monopolist choose to maximize profits? What is the price at this output level? What are the monopolist's profits? b. Assume instead that the monopolist has a cost structure where total costs are described by \\[C(Q)=0.25 Q^{2}-5 Q+300.\\] With the monopolist facing the same market demand and marginal revenue, what price-quantity combination will be chosen now to maximize profits? What will profits be? c. Assume now that a third cost structure explains the monopolist's position, with total costs given by \\[C(Q)=0.0133 Q^{3}-5 Q+250.\\] Again, calculate the monopolist's price-quantity combination that maximizes profits. What will profit be? Hint: Set \(M C=\) \(M R\) as usual and use the quadratic formula to solve the second-order equation for \(Q\) d. Graph the market demand curve, the \(M R\) curve, and the three marginal cost curves from parts (a), (b), and (c). Notice that the monopolist's profit- making ability is constrained by (1) the market demand curve (along with its associated \(M R\) curve) and (2) the cost structure underlying production.

Suppose the government wishes to combat the undesirable allocational effects of a monopoly through the use of a subsidy. a. Why would a lump-sum subsidy not achieve the government's goal? b. Use a graphical proof to show how a per-unit-of-output subsidy might achieve the government's goal. c. Suppose the government wants its subsidy to maximize the difference between the total value of the good to consumers and the good's total cost. Show that, to achieve this goal, the government should set \\[\frac{t}{P}=-\frac{1}{e_{Q, P}},\\] where \(t\) is the per-unit subsidy and \(P\) is the competitive price. Explain your result intuitively.

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