In this problem, we will use a more standard form of the CES utility function to derive indirect utility and expenditure functions. Suppose utility is given by $$U(x, y)=\left(x-x_{0}\right)^{\alpha} y^{\beta, }$$[in this function the elasticity of substitution \(\sigma=1 /(1-\delta)]\) a. Show that the indirect utility function for the utility function just given is $$V=I\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{-1 / r}$$ where \(r=\delta /(\delta-1)=1-\sigma\) b. Show that the function derived in part (a) is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income. c. Show that this function is strictly increasing in income. d. Show that this function is strictly decreasing in any price. e. Show that the expenditure function for this case of CES utility is given by $$E=V\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{1 / r}$$ f. Show that the function derived in part (e) is homogeneous of degree one in the goods' prices. g. Show that this expenditure function is increasing in each of the prices. h. Show that the function is concave in each price.

Short Answer

Expert verified
Based on the given CES utility function, we derived the indirect utility function, and found it to be homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income, as well as strictly increasing in income and strictly decreasing in any price. We also derived the expenditure function, which is homogeneous of degree one in goods' prices, increasing in each of the prices, and concave in each price. These properties provide valuable insights into consumer behavior and preferences, and can be used to analyze various economic situations and market conditions.

Step by step solution

01

Find the Marshallian demands for goods x and y

First, we will set up the Lagrangian for this problem: $$L=U(x,y)+\lambda (I-p_x x-p_y y)$$, where \(\lambda\) represents the Lagrange multiplier. We will solve for the Marshallian demands for both goods, \(x^* (p_x, p_y, I)\) and \(y^* (p_x, p_y, I)\). To do this, we will find the first-order conditions by taking the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to \(x\), \(y\), and \(\lambda\). $$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x}=\alpha (x-x_0)^{\alpha -1} y^{\beta}-\lambda p_x =0$$ $$\frac{\partial L}{\partial y}=(x-x_0)^{\alpha}\beta y^{\beta-1}-\lambda p_y =0$$ $$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda}=I-p_x x-p_y y=0$$ Next, we will solve for the Marshallian demands as functions of prices and income. Assume the solutions for Marshallian demands are \((x^*, y^*)\).
02

Substitute the Marshallian demands into the utility function for the indirect utility function

After finding the Marshallian demands in terms of prices and income, we substitute these expressions into our original utility function to find the indirect utility function, denoted as \(V(p_x, p_y, I)\). After substituting the Marshallian demands into the utility function, we obtain: $$V=I\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{-1 / r}$$ #b. Homogeneous of degree zero#
03

Test for homogeneity of degree zero

To check if the derived indirect utility function is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income, we will test for homogeneity by substituting \(tp_x\), \(tp_y\), and \(tI\) for \(p_x\), \(p_y\), and \(I\) respectively and find out if the resulting function simplifies to \(V(p_x,p_y,I)\) or not. $$V(tp_x, tp_y,tI)=tI\left((tp_x)^{r}+(tp_y)^{r}\right)^{-1 / r}$$
04

Simplify

Upon simplification, $$V(tp_x, tp_y,tI)=I\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{-1 / r}=V(p_x,p_y,I)$$ Thus, it is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income. #c. Strictly increasing in income#
05

Take partial derivative with respect to income

To check if the indirect utility function is strictly increasing in income, we will take the partial derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to income. $$\frac{\partial V}{\partial I}=\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{-1 / r}$$ Since \(\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{-1 / r}>0\), the function is strictly increasing in income. #d. Strictly decreasing in any price#
06

Take partial derivative with respect to prices

To check if the indirect utility function is strictly decreasing in any price, we will take the partial derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to \(p_x\) and \(p_y\). $$\frac{\partial V}{\partial p_x}= -\frac{I r p_{x}^{r-1}}{r \left(p_{x}^{r} + p_{y}^{r}\right)^{1+\frac{1}{r}}}$$ $$\frac{\partial V}{\partial p_y}= -\frac{I r p_{y}^{r-1}}{r \left(p_{x}^{r} + p_{y}^{r}\right)^{1+\frac{1}{r}}}$$ Since both \(\frac{\partial V}{\partial p_x}\) and \(\frac{\partial V}{\partial p_y}\) are negative, the function is strictly decreasing in any price. #e. Expenditure function# To find the expenditure function, we will invert the indirect utility function, denoted as \(E(p_x, p_y, V)\), and replace \(I\) with \(E\) in the expression: $$E=V\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{1 / r}$$ #f. Homogeneous of degree one in goods' prices#
07

Test for homogeneity of degree one

To check for homogeneity of degree one in the goods' prices, we will test for homogeneity by substituting \(tp_x\) and \(tp_y\) for \(p_x\) and \(p_y\) respectively and find out if the resulting function simplifies to \(tE(p_x,p_y,V)\) or not. $$E(tp_x, tp_y, V)=V\left((tp_x)^{r}+(tp_y)^{r}\right)^{1 / r}$$
08

Simplify

Upon simplification, $$E(tp_x, tp_y, V)=tV\left(p_{x}^{r}+p_{y}^{r}\right)^{1 / r}=tE(p_x,p_y,V)$$ Thus, it is homogeneous of degree one in the goods' prices. #g. Increasing in each of the prices#
09

Take partial derivatives with respect to prices

To check if the expenditure function is increasing in each of the prices, we will take the partial derivative of the expenditure function with respect to \(p_x\) and \(p_y\). $$\frac{\partial E}{\partial p_x} = \frac{V r p_{x}^{r-1}}{r\left(p_{x}^{r} + p_{y}^{r}\right)^{\frac{1}{r}-1}}$$ $$\frac{\partial E}{\partial p_y} = \frac{V r p_{y}^{r-1}}{r\left(p_{x}^{r} + p_{y}^{r}\right)^{\frac{1}{r}-1}}$$ Since both \(\frac{\partial E}{\partial p_x}\) and \(\frac{\partial E}{\partial p_y}\) are positive, the function is increasing in each of the prices. #h. Concave in each price#
10

Take the second partial derivatives with respect to prices

To check if the expenditure function is concave in each price, we will take the second partial derivative of the expenditure function with respect to \(p_x\) and \(p_y\). $$\frac{\partial^2 E}{\partial p_x^2} = \frac{V p_{x}^{2(r-1)}}{\left(p_{x}^{r} + p_{y}^{r}\right)^{2\left(\frac{1}{r}-1\right)}} \left(1 - \frac{p_{x}^{r}}{(p_x^{r} + p_y^{r})}\right)$$ $$\frac{\partial^2 E}{\partial p_y^2} = \frac{V p_{y}^{2(r-1)}}{\left(p_{x}^{r} + p_{y}^{r}\right)^{2\left(\frac{1}{r}-1\right)}} \left(1 - \frac{p_{y}^{r}}{(p_x^{r} + p_y^{r})}\right)$$ Since \(\frac{1}{r} < 1\) and \(\left(1 - \frac{p_{x}^{r}}{(p_x^{r} + p_y^{r})}\right) < 1\), we have \(\frac{\partial^2 E}{\partial p_x^2} < 0\). Similarly, we can conclude that \(\frac{\partial^2 E}{\partial p_y^2} < 0\). Hence, the function is concave in each price.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

The CES utility function we have used in this chapter is given by $$U(x, y)=\frac{x^{0}}{\delta}+\frac{y^{0}}{\delta}$$ a. Show that the first-order conditions for a constrained utility maximum with this function require individuals to choose goods in the proportion $$\frac{x}{y}=\left(\frac{p_{x}}{p_{y}}\right)^{1 /(\delta-1)}$$ b. Show that the result in part (a) implies that individuals will allocate their funds equally between \(x\) and \(y\) for the CobbDouglas case \((\delta=0),\) as we have shown before in several problems. c. How does the ratio \(p_{x} x / p_{y} y\) depend on the value of \(\delta\) ? Explain your results intuitively. (For further details on this function, see Extension E4.3.) d. Derive the indirect utility and expenditure functions for this case and check your results by describing the homogeneity properties of the functions you calculated.

Suppose individuals require a certain level of food \((x)\) to remain alive. Let this amount be given by \(x_{0}\). Once \(x_{0}\) is purchased, individuals obtain utility from food and other goods \((y)\) of the form $$U(x, y)=\left(x-x_{0}\right)^{\alpha} y^{\beta}$$ where \(\alpha+\beta=1\) a. Show that if \(I>p_{x} x_{0}\) then the individual will maximize utility by spending \(\alpha\left(I-p_{x} x_{0}\right)+p_{x} x_{0}\) on good \(x\) and \(\beta\left(I-p_{x} x_{0}\right)\) on good \(y\). Interpret this result. b. How do the ratios \(p_{x} x / I\) and \(p_{y} y / I\) change as income increases in this problem? (See also Extension E4.2 for more on this utility function.)

Michele, who has a relatively high income \(I\), has altruistic feelings toward Sofia, who lives in such poverty that she essentially has no income. Suppose Michele's preferences are represented by the utility function $$U_{1}\left(c_{1}, c_{2}\right)=c_{1}^{1-a} c_{2}^{a}$$ where \(c_{1}\) and \(c_{2}\) are Michele and Sofia's consumption levels, appearing as goods in a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function. Assume that Michele can spend her income either on her own or Sofia's consumption (through charitable donations) and that \(\$ 1\) buys a unit of consumption for either (thus, the "prices" of consumption are \(p_{1}=p_{2}=1\) ). a. Argue that the exponent \(a\) can be taken as a measure of the degree of Michele's altruism by providing an interpretation of extremes values \(a=0\) and \(a=1 .\) What value would make her a perfect altruist (regarding others the same as oneself)? b. Solve for Michele's optimal choices and demonstrate how they change with \(a\). c. Solve for Michele's optimal choices under an income tax at rate \(t .\) How do her choices change if there is a charitable deduction (so income spent on charitable deductions is not taxed)? Does the charitable deduction have a bigger incentive effect on more or less altruistic people? d. Return to the case without taxes for simplicity. Now suppose that Michele's altruism is represented by the utility function $$U_{1}\left(c_{1}, U_{2}\right)=c_{1}^{1-a} U_{2}^{a},$$ which is similar to the representation of altruism in Extension \(\mathrm{E} 3.4\) to the previous chapter. According to this specification, Michele cares directly about Sofia's utility level and only indirectly about Sofia's consumption level. 1\. Solve for Michele's optimal choices if Sofia's utility function is symmetric to Michele's: \(U_{2}\left(c_{2}, U_{1}\right)=c_{2}^{1-a} U_{1}^{a} .\) Compare your answer with part (b). Is Michele more or less charitable under the new specification? Explain. 2\. Repeat the previous analysis assuming Sofia's utility function is \(U_{2}\left(c_{2}\right)=c_{2}\)

Suppose that a fast-food junkie derives utility from three goods-soft drinks \((x),\) hamburgers \((y),\) and ice cream sundaes \((z)-\) according to the Cobb- Douglas utility function $$U(x, y, z)=x^{0.5} y^{0.5}(1+z)^{0.5}$$ Suppose also that the prices for these goods are given by \(p_{x}=1, p_{y}=4,\) and \(p_{z}=8\) and that this consumer's income is given by \(I=8\) a. Show that, for \(z=0\), maximization of utility results in the same optimal choices as in Example \(4.1 .\) Show also that any choice that results in \(z>0\) (even for a fractional \(z\) ) reduces utility from this optimum. b. How do you explain the fact that \(z=0\) is optimal here? c. How high would this individual's income have to be for any \(z\) to be purchased?

Mr. A derives utility from martinis \((m)\) in proportion to the number he drinks: \\[U(m)=m.\\] \(\mathrm{Mr}, \mathrm{A}\) is particular about his martinis, however: He only enjoys them made in the exact proportion of two parts gin \((g)\) to one part vermouth ( \(v\) ). Hence we can rewrite Mr. A's utility function as \\[U(m)=U(g, v)=\min \left(\frac{g}{2}, v\right).\\] a. Graph Mr. A's indifference curve in terms of \(g\) and \(v\) for various levels of utility. Show that, regardless of the prices of the two ingredients, Mr. A will never alter the way he mixes martinis. b. Calculate the demand functions for \(g\) and \(v\). c. Using the results from part (b), what is Mr. A's indirect utility function? d. Calculate Mr. A's expenditure function; for each level of utility, show spending as a function of \(p_{8}\) and \(p_{v}\). Hint: Because this problem involves a fixed-proportions utility function, you cannot solve for utility-maximizing decisions by using calculus.

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