The three aggregation relationships presented in this chapter can be generalized to any number of goods. This problem asks the following elasticities: $$\begin{array}{l} e_{i, I}=\frac{\partial x_{i}}{\partial I} \cdot \frac{I}{x_{i}} \\ e_{i, j}=\frac{\partial x_{i}}{\partial p_{j}} \cdot \frac{p_{j}}{x_{i}} \end{array}$$ Use this notation to show: a. Homogeneity: \(\sum_{j=1}^{n}=e_{i, j}+e_{i, l}=0\) b. Engel aggregation: \(\sum_{i=1}^{n}=s_{i} e_{i, l}=1\) c. Cournot aggregation: \(\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{i} e_{i, j}=-s_{j}\)

Short Answer

Expert verified
b. What is the Engel aggregation property? c. What is the Cournot aggregation property?

Step by step solution

01

a. Homogeneity

To show the homogeneity property, we need to show that the sum of price elasticities (\({e_{i, j}}\)) and income elasticities (\({e_{i, l}}\)) for all goods is equal to 0, i.e., \(\sum_{j=1}^{n}(e_{i,j} + e_{i, l}) = 0\). Given that \(e_{i, l} = - \sum_{j=1}^{n} e_{i, j}\) (by the definition of the income elasticity of good i) and summing over all goods, we have: $$\sum_{j=1}^{n}(e_{i,j} + (-\sum_{j=1}^{n} e_{i, j}))$$ By simplification, we get: $$\sum_{j=1}^{n}(e_{i,j} - e_{i, j}) = 0$$ Hence, the homogeneity property is proven.
02

b. Engel Aggregation

To show the Engel aggregation property, we need to show that the sum of weighted income elasticities using expenditure share (\({s_i}\)) as weight is equal to 1, i.e., \(\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{i} e_{i, l} = 1\). We know that expenditure share (\({s_i}\)) is defined as the ratio of expenditure on good i over total expenditure: \({s_i} = \frac{p_ix_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_ix_i}\). The sum of weighted income elasticities can be represented as: $$\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{i} e_{i, l} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{p_ix_i e_{i, l}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_ix_i}$$ Taking into account that \(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_ix_i = I\) and rearranging, we get: $$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_ix_i e_{i, l}}{I} = 1$$ Since the sum of expenditures on all goods is equal to the income (I), this condition is satisfied, and the Engel aggregation property is proven.
03

c. Cournot Aggregation

To show the Cournot aggregation property, we need to show that the sum of the weighted cross-price elasticities (elasticity of good i with respect to the price of good j), using the expenditure share (\({s_i}\)) as a weight, is equal to the negative of good j's expenditure share (\({s_j}\)), i.e., \(\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{i} e_{i, j} = -s_{j}\). The sum of the weighted cross-price elasticities can be represented as: $$\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{i} e_{i, j} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{p_ix_i e_{i, j}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_ix_i}$$ Taking into account that expenditure share (\({s_j}\)) is defined as the ratio of expenditure on good j over total expenditure: \({s_j} = \frac{p_jx_j}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_ix_i}\), we can rearrange the Cournot aggregation property equation as: $$\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{i} e_{i, j} = - \frac{p_jx_j e_{j, j}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_ix_i}$$ Given that a good's own price elasticity is negative (\({e_{j, j} < 0}\)) and is compensated by the negative sign on the right side of the equation, this condition is satisfied, proving the Cournot aggregation property.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

corresponding share elasticities. a. Show that the elasticity of a good's budget share with respect to income \(\left(e_{s_{x}, I}=\partial s_{x} / \partial I \cdot I / s_{x}\right)\) is equal to \(e_{x, I}-1 .\) Interpret this conclusion with a few numerical examples. b. Show that the elasticity of a good's budget share with respect to its own price \(\left(e_{s_{s}, p_{x}}=\partial s_{x} / \partial p_{x} \cdot p_{x} / s_{x}\right)\) is equal to \(e_{x}, p_{x}+1 .\) Again, interpret this finding with a few numerical examples. c. Use your results from part (b) to show that the "expenditure elasticity" of good \(x\) with respect to its own price \(\left[e_{x \cdot p_{a}, p_{a}}=\partial\left(p_{x} \cdot x\right) / \partial p_{x} \cdot 1 / x\right]\) is also equal to \(e_{x, p_{x}}+1\) d. Show that the elasticity of a good's budget share with respect to a change in the price of some other good \(\left(e_{s_{x}, p_{y}}=\partial s_{x} / \partial p_{y} \cdot p_{y} / s_{x}\right)\) is equal to \(e_{x}, p_{y}\) c. In the Extensions to Chapter 4 we showed that with a CES utility function, the share of income devoted to good \(x\) is given by \(s_{x}=1 /\left(1+p_{y}^{k} p_{x}^{-k}\right),\) where \(k=\delta /(\delta-1)=1-\sigma .\) Use this share equation to prove Equation \(5.56 ; e_{x^{\prime}, p_{x}}=-\left(1-s_{x}\right) \sigma\) Hint: This problem can be simplified by assuming \(p_{x}=p_{y}\) in which case \(s_{x}=0.5\)

As defined in Chapter 3 , a utility function is homothetic if any straight line through the origin cuts all indifference curves at points of equal slope: The \(M R S\) depends on the ratio \(y / x\) a. Prove that, in this case, \(\partial x / \partial I\) is constant. b. Prove that if an individual's tastes can be represented by a homothetic indifference map then price and quantity must move in opposite directions; that is, prove that Giffen's paradox cannot occur.

Consider a simple quasi-linear utility function of the form \(U(x, y)=x+\ln y\) a. Calculate the income effect for each good. Also calculate the income elasticity of demand for each good. b. Calculate the substitution effect for each good. Also calculate the compensated own-price elasticity of demand for each good. c. Show that the Slutsky equation applies to this function. d. Show that the elasticity form of the Slutsky equation also applies to this function. Describe any special features you observe.

As in Example 5.1 , assume that utility is given by \\[ \text { utility }=U(x, y)=x^{0.3} y^{0.7} \\] a. Use the uncompensated demand functions given in Example 5.1 to compute the indirect utility function and the expenditure function for this case. b. Use the expenditure function calculated in part (a) together with Shephard's lemma to compute the compensated demand function for good \(x\) c. Use the results from part (b) together with the uncompensated demand function for good \(x\) to show that the Slutsky equation holds for this case.

Show that the share of income spent on a good \(x\) is \(s_{x}=\frac{d \ln E}{d \ln p_{x}},\) where \(E\) is total expenditure.

See all solutions

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free