Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex then he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: Yes, individuals with a convex utility function prefer fair gambles and may even prefer somewhat unfair gambles over income certainty depending on the shape of the utility function and the expected payoff from the gamble. However, the occurrence of such behavior might be limited by various factors such as limited access to wealth, cognitive biases, market imperfections, and cultural factors.

Step by step solution

01

Define a convex utility function

A convex utility function, in the context of wealth, represents an individual's preference for taking risks. It has the property that the individual derives more satisfaction from the average utility of two outcomes than from the utility of the average outcome. Mathematically, this can be expressed as follows: For a utility function U(w), if U is convex, U(\frac{w_1 + w_2}{2}) > \frac{U(w_1) + U(w_2)}{2} where w_1 and w_2 are two different wealth levels.
02

Define a fair gamble

A fair gamble is defined as a situation where the expected monetary value of gain and loss is equal, so there is neither an expected gain nor a loss for the individual participating in the gamble. An example of a fair gamble is a coin toss where you win 10 units of wealth if the coin lands heads and lose 10 units of wealth if the coin lands tails.
03

Show preference for fair gambles

With a convex utility function, let's analyze the preference for a fair gamble. Suppose we have two wealth levels, w_1 and w_2, and a fair gamble is offered with an equal probability of ending up with either wealth level (50% chance of getting w_1 and 50% chance of getting w_2). The expected utility from the gamble is: EU_gamble = \frac{1}{2}U(w_1) + \frac{1}{2}U(w_2). Now, let's compare this with the utility from income certainty which is at the average wealth: U(\frac{w_1 + w_2}{2}). As the utility function is convex, we have: U(\frac{w_1 + w_2}{2}) > \frac{U(w_1) + U(w_2)}{2}. But since EU_gamble = \frac{1}{2}U(w_1) + \frac{1}{2}U(w_2), this means that: U(\frac{w_1 + w_2}{2}) > EU_gamble. This demonstrates that an individual with a convex utility function will prefer a fair gamble over income certainty.
04

Show preference for somewhat unfair gambles

An individual with a convex utility function may also be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles, depending on the exact shape of the utility function and the expected payoff from the gamble. For example, if the potential gains from an unfair gamble are large enough relative to the potential losses, they might outweigh the negative impact of the losses. In this case, the expected utility of the unfair gamble would still be greater than the utility of income certainty.
05

Discuss the prevalence and limitation factors

While it is possible for individuals to have convex utility functions and prefer taking risks, the prevalence of such behavior may be limited by various factors. Some of these factors include: 1. Limited access to wealth: Individuals may be unable to participate in gambles due to limited income or wealth. 2. Cognitive biases and psychological factors: Individuals might overestimate the probability of negative outcomes or be excessively optimistic about the potential gains, thus affecting their decision-making process. 3. Market imperfections and regulation: Legal restrictions or other market imperfections might limit the availability of certain types of gambles. 4. Social and cultural factors: Social norms and cultural values might inhibit risk-taking behavior or influence how individuals perceive risks. Overall, while convex utility functions can help explain some risk-taking behavior, numerous factors might tend to limit its occurrence in reality.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

The CARA and CRRA utility functions are both members of a more general class of utility functions called harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA) functions. The general form for this function is \(U(W)=\theta(\mu+W / \gamma)^{1-\gamma}\), where the various parameters obey the following restrictions: \(\bullet$$\gamma \leq 1\) \(\bullet$$\mu+W / \gamma > 0\) \(\bullet$$\theta[(1-\gamma) / \gamma] > 0\) The reasons for the first two restrictions are obvious; the third is required so that \(U^{\prime} > 0\) a. Calculate \(r(W)\) for this function. Show that the reciprocal of this expression is linear in \(W\). This is the origin of the term harmonic in the function's name. b. Show that when \(\mu=0\) and \(\theta=[(1-\gamma) / \gamma]^{\gamma-1},\) this function reduces to the CRRA function given in Chapter 7 (see footnote 17 ). c. Use your result from part (a) to show that if \(\gamma \rightarrow \infty\), then \(r(W)\) is a constant for this function. d. Let the constant found in part (c) be represented by \(A\). Show that the implied form for the utility function in this case is the CARA function given in Equation 7.35 e. Finally, show that a quadratic utility function can be generated from the HARA function simply by setting \(\gamma=-1\) f. Despite the seeming generality of the HARA function, it still exhibits several limitations for the study of behavior in uncertain situations. Describe some of these shortcomings.

In Example 7.3 we showed that a person with a CARA utility function who faces a Normally distributed risk will have expected utility of the form \(E[U(W)]=\mu_{W}-(A / 2) \sigma_{W}^{2},\) where \(\mu_{W}\) is the expected value of wealth and \(\sigma_{W}^{2}\) is its variance. Use this fact to solve for the optimal portfolio allocation for a person with a CARA utility function who must invest \(k\) of his or her wealth in a Normally distributed risky asset whose expected return is \(\mu_{r}\) and variance in return is \(\sigma_{r}^{2}\) (your answer should depend on \(A\) ). Explain your results intuitively.

For the CRRA utility function (Equation 7.42), we showed that the degree of risk aversion is measured by 1 \(-R\). In Chapter 3 we showed that the elasticity of substitution for the same function is given by \(1 /(1-R)\). Hence the measures are reciprocals of each other. Using this result, discuss the following questions. a. Why is risk aversion related to an individual's willingness to substitute wealth between states of the world? What phenomenon is being captured by both concepts? b. How would you interpret the polar cases \(R=1\) and \(R=-\infty\) in both the risk-aversion and substitution frameworks? c. A rise in the price of contingent claims in "bad" times \(\left(p_{b}\right)\) will induce substitution and income effects into the demands for \(W_{g}\) and \(W_{b^{*}}\) If the individual has a fixed budget to devote to these two goods, how will choices among them be affected? Why might \(W_{g}\) rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the individual? d. Suppose that empirical data suggest an individual requires an average return of 0.5 percent before being tempted to invest in an investment that has a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 5 percent. That is, this person gets the same utility from \(W_{0}\) as from an even bet on \(1.055 \mathrm{W}_{0}\) and \(0.955 \mathrm{W}_{0}\) (1) What value of \(R\) is consistent with this behavior? (2) How much average return would this person require to accept a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 10 percent? Note: This part requires solving nonlinear equations, so approximate solutions will suffice. The comparison of the riskreward trade-off illustrates what is called the equity premium puzzle in that risky investments seem actually to earn much more than is consistent with the degree of risk aversion suggested by other data. See N. R. Kocherlakota, "The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle," Journal of Economic Literature (March 1996 ): \(42-71\).

Ms. Fogg is planning an around-the-world trip on which she plans to spend \(\$ 10,000\). The utility from the trip is a function of how much she actually spends on it ( \(Y\) ), given by \\[ U(Y)=\ln Y \\] a. If there is a 25 percent probability that Ms. Fogg will lose \(\$ 1,000\) of her cash on the trip, what is the trip's expected utility? b. Suppose that Ms. Fogg can buy insurance against losing the \(\$ 1,000\) (say, by purchasing traveler's checks) at an "actuarially fair" premium of \(\$ 250 .\) Show that her expected utility is higher if she purchases this insurance than if she faces the chance of losing the \(\$ 1,000\) without insurance. c. What is the maximum amount that Ms. Fogg would be willing to pay to insure her \(\$ 1,000 ?\)

Two pioneers of the field of behavioral economics, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (winners of the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 , conducted an experiment in which they presented different groups of subjects with one of the following two scenarios: Scenario 1: In addition to \(\$ 1,000\) up front, the subject must choose between two gambles. Gamble \(A\) offers an even chance of winning \(\$ 1,000\) or nothing. Gamble \(B\) provides \(\$ 500\) with certainty. Scenario 2: In addition to \(\$ 2,000\) given up front, the subject must choose between two gambles. Gamble \(C\) offers an even chance of losing \(\$ 1,000\) or nothing. Gamble \(D\) results in the loss of \(\$ 500\) with certainty. a. Suppose Standard Stan makes choices under uncertainty according to expected utility theory. If Stan is risk neutral, what choice would he make in each scenario? b. What choice would Stan make if he is risk averse? c. Kahneman and Tversky found 16 percent of subjects chose \(A\) in the first scenario and 68 percent chose \(C\) in the second scenario. Based on your preceding answers, explain why these findings are hard to reconcile with expected utility theory. d. Kahneman and Tversky proposed an alternative to expected utility theory, called prospect theory, to explain the experimental results. The theory is that people's current income level functions as an "anchor point" for them. They are risk averse over gains beyond this point but sensitive to small losses below this point. This sensitivity to small losses is the opposite of risk aversion: \(A\) risk-averse person suffers disproportionately more from a large than a small loss. (1) Prospect Pete makes choices under uncertainty according to prospect theory. What choices would he make in Kahneman and Tversky's experiment? Explain. (2) Draw a schematic diagram of a utility curve over money for Prospect Pete in the first scenario. Draw a utility curve for him in the second scenario. Can the same curve suffice for both scenarios, or must it shift? How do Pete's utility curves differ from the ones we are used to drawing for people like Standard \(\operatorname{Stan} ?\)

See all solutions

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free