Suppose there is a \(50-50\) chance that a risk-averse individual with a current wealth of \(\$ 20,000\) will contract a debilitating disease and suffer a loss of \(\$ 10,000\) a. Calculate the cost of actuarially fair insurance in this situation and use a utility-of-wealth graph (such as shown in Figure 7.1 ) to show that the individual will prefer fair insurance against this loss to accepting the gamble uninsured. b. Suppose two types of insurance policies were available: (1) a fair policy covering the complete loss; and (2) a fair policy covering only half of any loss incurred. Calculate the cost of the second type of policy and show that the individual will generally regard it as inferior to the first.

Short Answer

Expert verified
Explain your answer based on the utility theory of risk-averse individuals. Answer: A risk-averse individual would generally regard an insurance policy covering the complete loss as superior. This is because, based on the utility theory of risk-averse individuals, they prefer to minimize their exposure to the risk of loss. In this scenario, the insurance policy covering the complete loss provides better protection and ensures higher utility of wealth for the individual compared to the policy covering only half of the loss.

Step by step solution

01

Calculate the expected loss

First, we need to find the expected loss from the debilitating disease. Given that there is a 50-50 chance of the individual contracting the disease and hence, suffering a loss of $10,000. The expected loss can be computed as follows: Expected Loss = Probability of contracting disease * Loss = 0.5 * $10,000 = $5,000
02

Calculate the cost of actuarially fair insurance

Actuarially fair insurance means that the insurance premium is equal to the expected loss. In this case, the cost of actuarially fair insurance can be calculated as: Cost of fair insurance = Expected Loss = $5,000
03

Illustrate the utility-of-wealth graph

Since the individual is risk-averse, their utility function is concave. We can illustrate this situation with the following graph: - On the x-axis, plot wealth ranging from \(10,000 to \)20,000 - On the y-axis, plot the utility of wealth - Draw a concave utility function curve - Mark the initial wealth of the individual ($20,000) on the x-axis, and the corresponding utility on the curve - Also mark the utility points if the individual contracts the disease with and without insurance - The graph should show a higher utility of wealth for the individual when they have insurance compared to when they are uninsured Based on the utility graph, the risk-averse individual would prefer to purchase the fair insurance against the loss rather than accepting the gamble uninsured, as it provides them a higher utility of wealth. #Part B#
04

Calculate the cost of fair insurance covering the complete loss

Since the individual already has a fair insurance policy covering the complete loss for a premium of $5,000 (from Part A), we can use this value to compare it with the second type of insurance policy. Cost of fair insurance covering complete loss = $5,000
05

Calculate the cost of fair insurance covering only half of the loss

Now, let's calculate the premium of the fair insurance policy covering only half of any loss incurred. To do this, we need to find the expected loss covered by the insurance policy: Expected Loss covered by the policy = 0.5 * $5,000 = $2,500 Since this is an actuarially fair insurance policy, the premium is equal to the expected loss covered by the policy: Cost of fair insurance covering half of the loss = Expected Loss covered by the policy = $2,500
06

Compare the two insurance policies

Now, we can compare the two insurance policies: 1. Fair insurance policy covering the complete loss: Cost = $5,000 2. Fair insurance policy covering half of the loss: Cost = $2,500 Since the individual is risk-averse, they would prefer to minimize their exposure to the risk of loss. In this case, the first insurance policy (covering the complete loss) provides better protection for the individual compared to the second policy (covering only half of the loss). Therefore, the risk-averse individual would generally regard the first policy as superior to the second one.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with Vaia!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

Investment in risky assets can be examined in the state-preference framework by assuming that \(W^{*}\) dollars invested in an asset with a certain return \(r\) will yield \(W^{*}(1+r)\) in both states of the world, whereas investment in a risky asset will yield \(W^{+}\left(1+r_{g}\right)\) in good times and \(W^{*}\left(1+r_{b}\right)\) in bad times (where \(r_{g}>r>r_{b}\) ). a. Graph the outcomes from the two investments. b. Show how a "mixed portfolio" containing both risk-free and risky assets could be illustrated in your graph. How would you show the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset? c. Show how individuals' attitudes toward risk will determine the mix of risk- free and risky assets they will hold. In what case would a person hold no risky assets? d. If an individual's utility takes the constant relative risk aversion form (Equation 7.42 ), explain why this person will not change the fraction of risky assets held as his or her wealth increases. \(^{25}\)

In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is \(f\). Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (i.e., \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where \(W\) is the individual's wealth). Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? Hint: Use the Taylor series approximation \(U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+\left(f^{2} / 2\right) U^{\prime \prime}(W)\)

For the CRRA utility function (Equation 7.42), we showed that the degree of risk aversion is measured by 1 \(-R\). In Chapter 3 we showed that the elasticity of substitution for the same function is given by \(1 /(1-R)\). Hence the measures are reciprocals of each other. Using this result, discuss the following questions. a. Why is risk aversion related to an individual's willingness to substitute wealth between states of the world? What phenomenon is being captured by both concepts? b. How would you interpret the polar cases \(R=1\) and \(R=-\infty\) in both the risk-aversion and substitution frameworks? c. A rise in the price of contingent claims in "bad" times \(\left(p_{b}\right)\) will induce substitution and income effects into the demands for \(W_{g}\) and \(W_{b^{*}}\) If the individual has a fixed budget to devote to these two goods, how will choices among them be affected? Why might \(W_{g}\) rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the individual? d. Suppose that empirical data suggest an individual requires an average return of 0.5 percent before being tempted to invest in an investment that has a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 5 percent. That is, this person gets the same utility from \(W_{0}\) as from an even bet on \(1.055 \mathrm{W}_{0}\) and \(0.955 \mathrm{W}_{0}\) (1) What value of \(R\) is consistent with this behavior? (2) How much average return would this person require to accept a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 10 percent? Note: This part requires solving nonlinear equations, so approximate solutions will suffice. The comparison of the riskreward trade-off illustrates what is called the equity premium puzzle in that risky investments seem actually to earn much more than is consistent with the degree of risk aversion suggested by other data. See N. R. Kocherlakota, "The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle," Journal of Economic Literature (March 1996 ): \(42-71\).

Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex then he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

Two pioneers of the field of behavioral economics, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (winners of the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 , conducted an experiment in which they presented different groups of subjects with one of the following two scenarios: Scenario 1: In addition to \(\$ 1,000\) up front, the subject must choose between two gambles. Gamble \(A\) offers an even chance of winning \(\$ 1,000\) or nothing. Gamble \(B\) provides \(\$ 500\) with certainty. Scenario 2: In addition to \(\$ 2,000\) given up front, the subject must choose between two gambles. Gamble \(C\) offers an even chance of losing \(\$ 1,000\) or nothing. Gamble \(D\) results in the loss of \(\$ 500\) with certainty. a. Suppose Standard Stan makes choices under uncertainty according to expected utility theory. If Stan is risk neutral, what choice would he make in each scenario? b. What choice would Stan make if he is risk averse? c. Kahneman and Tversky found 16 percent of subjects chose \(A\) in the first scenario and 68 percent chose \(C\) in the second scenario. Based on your preceding answers, explain why these findings are hard to reconcile with expected utility theory. d. Kahneman and Tversky proposed an alternative to expected utility theory, called prospect theory, to explain the experimental results. The theory is that people's current income level functions as an "anchor point" for them. They are risk averse over gains beyond this point but sensitive to small losses below this point. This sensitivity to small losses is the opposite of risk aversion: \(A\) risk-averse person suffers disproportionately more from a large than a small loss. (1) Prospect Pete makes choices under uncertainty according to prospect theory. What choices would he make in Kahneman and Tversky's experiment? Explain. (2) Draw a schematic diagram of a utility curve over money for Prospect Pete in the first scenario. Draw a utility curve for him in the second scenario. Can the same curve suffice for both scenarios, or must it shift? How do Pete's utility curves differ from the ones we are used to drawing for people like Standard \(\operatorname{Stan} ?\)

See all solutions

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.

Sign-up for free