Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex (rather than concave, as shown in Figure 8.1 ), he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

Short Answer

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Answer: A convex utility-of-wealth function implies that an individual's utility increases at an increasing rate and may prefer fair gambles over income certainty due to the higher potential satisfaction derived from larger wealth increases. They might even be willing to accept unfair gambles as the potential large gains outweigh the possible losses. However, factors like personal preferences, financial constraints, limited knowledge, and market regulations might limit the occurrence of such risk-taking behavior.

Step by step solution

01

Define Convex Utility-of-Wealth Function

A utility-of-wealth function represents the satisfaction derived from a given level of wealth. A convex utility function indicates that the individual's utility increases at an increasing rate. In contrast, a concave utility function, as shown in Figure 8.1, indicates that the individual's utility increases at a decreasing rate.
02

Explain Preference for Fair Gambles

If the utility function is convex, the individual derives greater utility from wealth increases. This implies that the individual would prefer the potential for larger wealth increases in a gamble over a fixed, less-variable income. Let's use a simple example to illustrate this. Suppose an individual has the option between a certain income of \(X\), and a fair gamble where they have a 50% chance of winning \(2X\) and a 50% chance of losing \(X\). The expected value of the gamble is also \(X\). However, with a convex utility function, the utility derived from winning \(2X\) would be substantially more significant than the disutility from losing \(X\). The individual would, therefore, prefer the gamble over the guaranteed income of \(X\).
03

Willingness to Accept Unfair Gambles

Similarly, an individual with a convex utility function would be more likely to accept unfair gambles because the potential utility derived from the larger wealth increases outweighs the disutility from losses. This risk-taking behavior will depend on the level of convexity of the individual's utility function, as well as their beliefs about the probability distribution of possible outcomes.
04

Discuss Prevalence of Risk-Taking Behavior and Factors Limiting its Occurrence

This sort of risk-taking behavior can be observed in certain circumstances, such as in entrepreneurship, investments, or gambling activities. However, not all individuals exhibit such risk-seeking behavior due to various factors. Factors that might limit risk-taking behavior include: 1. Personal preferences and risk tolerance: Some individuals have a more conservative attitude towards risk-taking and prefer stable and secure incomes to the possibility of large fluctuations in wealth. 2. Financial constraints and responsibilities: Individuals with financial obligations or limited resources may not be able to afford potential losses, thus limiting their exposure to risk. 3. Information and knowledge: A lack of understanding about potential returns and risks associated with certain activities may dissuade individuals from participating in them. 4. Market regulations and restrictions: Laws and policies aimed at reducing risk in financial markets can influence the decision-making process of individuals and limit the occurrence of risk-taking behavior. In conclusion, while the convex utility-of-wealth function may lead to risk-seeking behavior in some cases, personal preferences, financial constraints, knowledge, and market regulations can limit the occurrence of such behavior.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Ms. Fogg is planning an around-the-world trip on which she plans to spend \(\$ 10,000\). The utility from the trip is a function of how much she actually spends on it \((Y),\) given by \\[ U(Y)=\ln Y \\] a. If there is a 25 percent probability that Ms. Fogg will lose \(\$ 1000\) of her cash on the trip, what is the trip's expected utility? b. Suppose that Ms. Fogg can buy insurance against losing the \(\$ 1000\) (say, by purchasing traveler's checks) at an "actuarially fair" premium of \(\$ 250 .\) Show that her expected utility is higher if she purchases this insurance than if she faces the chance of losing the \(\$ 1000\) without insurance. c. What is the maximum amount that Ms. Fogg would be willing to pay to insure her \(\$ 1000 ?\)

In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is / Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (that is, \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where Wis the individual's wealth) Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? \([\text {Hint}\) : Use the Taylor \(\text { series approximation }\left.U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+-U^{\prime \prime}(W) .\right]\)

Suppose Molly Jock wishes to purchase a high-definition television to watch the Olympic Greco-Roman wrestling competition. Her current income is \(\$ 20,000,\) and she knows where she can buy the television she wants for \(\$ 2,000\). She has heard the rumor that the same set can be bought at Crazy Eddie's (recently out of bankruptcy) for \(\$ 1,700,\) but is unsure if the rumor is true. Suppose this individual's utility is given by \\[\text { utility }=\ln (Y).\\] where Fis her income after buying the television. a. What is Molly's utility if she buys from the location she knows? b. What is Molly's utility if Crazy Eddie's really does offer the lower price? c. Suppose Molly believes there is a \(50-50\) chance that Crazy Eddie does offer the lowerpriced television, but it will cost her \(\$ 100\) to drive to the discount store to find out for sure (the store is far away and has had its phone disconnected). Is it worth it to her to invest the money in the trip?

For the constant relative risk aversion utility function (Equation 8.62 ) we showed that the degree of risk aversion is measured by \((1-R)\). In Chapter 3 we showed that the elasticity of substitution for the same function is given by \(1 /(1-R) .\) Hence, the measures are reciprocals of each other. Using this result, discuss the following questions: a. Why is risk aversion related to an individual's willingness to substitute wealth between states of the world? What phenomenon is being captured by both concepts? b. How would you interpret the polar cases \(R=1\) and \(R--^{\circ}\) in both the risk-aversion and substitution frameworks? c. A rise in the price of contingent claims in "bad" times \(\left(P_{b}\right)\) will induce substitution and income effects into the demands for \(W_{g}\) and \(W_{h}\). If the individual has a fixed budget to devote to these two goods, how will choices among them be affected? Why might \(W_{g}\) rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the individual? d. Suppose that empirical data suggest an individual requires an average return of 0.5 per cent if he or she is to be tempted to invest in an investment that has a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 5 percent. That is, this person gets the same utility from \(W_{o}\) as from an even bet on \(1.055 W_{o}\) and \(0.955 W_{o}\) i. What value of \(R\) is consistent with this behavior? ii. How much average return would this person require to accept a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 10 percent? Note: This part requires solving nonlinear equations, so approximate solutions will suffice. The comparison of the risk/reward trade-off illustrates what is called the "equity premium puzzle," in that risky investments seem to actually earn much more than is consistent with the degree of risk-aversion suggested by other data. See N. R. Kocherlakota, "The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle" Journal of Economic Literature (March 1996 ): \(42-71\)

A farmer believes there is a \(50-50\) chance that the next growing season will be abnormally rainy. His expected utility function has the form \\[ \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{1} \\ \text { expected utility }=-\boldsymbol{I} \boldsymbol{n} \boldsymbol{Y}_{N R}+-\boldsymbol{I} \boldsymbol{n} \boldsymbol{Y}_{R} \end{array} \\] where \(Y_{N R}\) and \(Y_{R}\) represent the farmer's income in the states of "normal rain" and "rainy," respectively. a. Suppose the farmer must choose between two crops that promise the following income prospects: $$\begin{array}{lcr} \text { Crop } & Y_{H} & Y_{R} \\ \hline \text { Wheat } & \$ 28,000 & \$ 10,000 \\ \text { Corn } & 19,000 & 15,000 \end{array}$$ Which of the crops will he plant? b. Suppose the farmer can plant half his field with each crop. Would he choose to do so? Explain your result. c. What mix of wheat and corn would provide maximum expected utility to this farmer? d. Would wheat crop insurance, available to farmers who grow only wheat, which costs \(\$ 4000\) and pays off \(\$ 8000\) in the event of a rainy growing season, cause this farmer to change what he plants?

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