Suppose there is a \(50-50\) chance that a risk-averse individual with a current wealth of \(\$ 20,000\) will contact a debilitating disease and suffer a loss of \(\$ 10,000\) a. Calculate the cost of actuarially fair insurance in this situation and use a utility-of-wealth graph (such as shown in Figure 8.1 ) to show that the individual will prefer fair insurance against this loss to accepting the gamble uninsured. b. Suppose two types of insurance policies were available: (1) A fair policy covering the complete loss. (2) A fair policy covering only half of any loss incurred. Calculate the cost of the second type of policy and show that the individual will generally regard it as inferior to the first.

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: A risk-averse individual will prefer the fair insurance policy covering the full loss amount because it provides higher utility compared to the policy covering only half of the loss. The second policy has a lower cost, but the individual's utility is higher with the first policy as it covers the complete loss.

Step by step solution

01

a. Cost of Actuarially Fair Insurance and Preference

1. Calculate the expected loss: The risk-averse individual has a \(50-50\) chance of losing \(\$10,000\). The expected loss can be calculated as follows: $$ Expected\ Loss = Probability\ of\ Loss \times Loss\ Amount $$ $$ Expected\ Loss = 0.5 \times \$10,000 = \$5,000 $$ 2. Calculate the actuarially fair insurance premium: The actuarially fair insurance premium is equal to the expected loss, in this case, \(\$5,000\). 3. Use a utility-of-wealth graph to show preference: To show preference using a utility-of-wealth graph, plot the individual's utility function with wealth on the x-axis and utility on the y-axis. Since the individual is risk-averse, the utility function will be concave. 4. Position of fair insurance and gamble uninsured: To show preference, locate the points representing the individual's wealth when buying fair insurance, accepting the gamble uninsured, and suffering the loss on the graph. As the person is risk-averse, fair insurance will have a higher utility compared to accepting the gamble uninsured.
02

b. Comparison of the Two Types of Insurance Policies

1. Calculate the cost of the second policy: The second policy covers only half of any loss incurred, i.e., \(\$5,000\). The fair insurance premium for the second policy is equal to half of the expected loss: $$ Cost\ of\ Second\ Policy = 0.5 \times \$5,000 = \$2,500 ``` 2. Compare both policies: To show that the second policy is inferior, compare the utility of wealth for both insurance policies. Since the second policy only covers half of the loss, the person would lose more of their wealth in the case of the debilitating disease. In this case, the utility of the second policy is less than the utility of the first policy. 3. Conclusion: Overall, the risk-averse individual will prefer the fair policy covering the complete loss (first policy) to a fair policy covering only half of any loss incurred (second policy). The cost of the second policy is less, but the individual's utility is higher with the first policy as it covers the complete loss.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex (rather than concave, as shown in Figure 8.1 ), he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is / Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (that is, \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where Wis the individual's wealth) Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? \([\text {Hint}\) : Use the Taylor \(\text { series approximation }\left.U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+-U^{\prime \prime}(W) .\right]\)

Ms. Fogg is planning an around-the-world trip on which she plans to spend \(\$ 10,000\). The utility from the trip is a function of how much she actually spends on it \((Y),\) given by \\[ U(Y)=\ln Y \\] a. If there is a 25 percent probability that Ms. Fogg will lose \(\$ 1000\) of her cash on the trip, what is the trip's expected utility? b. Suppose that Ms. Fogg can buy insurance against losing the \(\$ 1000\) (say, by purchasing traveler's checks) at an "actuarially fair" premium of \(\$ 250 .\) Show that her expected utility is higher if she purchases this insurance than if she faces the chance of losing the \(\$ 1000\) without insurance. c. What is the maximum amount that Ms. Fogg would be willing to pay to insure her \(\$ 1000 ?\)

For the constant relative risk aversion utility function (Equation 8.62 ) we showed that the degree of risk aversion is measured by \((1-R)\). In Chapter 3 we showed that the elasticity of substitution for the same function is given by \(1 /(1-R) .\) Hence, the measures are reciprocals of each other. Using this result, discuss the following questions: a. Why is risk aversion related to an individual's willingness to substitute wealth between states of the world? What phenomenon is being captured by both concepts? b. How would you interpret the polar cases \(R=1\) and \(R--^{\circ}\) in both the risk-aversion and substitution frameworks? c. A rise in the price of contingent claims in "bad" times \(\left(P_{b}\right)\) will induce substitution and income effects into the demands for \(W_{g}\) and \(W_{h}\). If the individual has a fixed budget to devote to these two goods, how will choices among them be affected? Why might \(W_{g}\) rise or fall depending on the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the individual? d. Suppose that empirical data suggest an individual requires an average return of 0.5 per cent if he or she is to be tempted to invest in an investment that has a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 5 percent. That is, this person gets the same utility from \(W_{o}\) as from an even bet on \(1.055 W_{o}\) and \(0.955 W_{o}\) i. What value of \(R\) is consistent with this behavior? ii. How much average return would this person require to accept a \(50-50\) chance of gaining or losing 10 percent? Note: This part requires solving nonlinear equations, so approximate solutions will suffice. The comparison of the risk/reward trade-off illustrates what is called the "equity premium puzzle," in that risky investments seem to actually earn much more than is consistent with the degree of risk-aversion suggested by other data. See N. R. Kocherlakota, "The Equity Premium: It's Still a Puzzle" Journal of Economic Literature (March 1996 ): \(42-71\)

An individual purchases a dozen eggs and must take them home. Although making trips home is costless, there is a 50 percent chance that all of the eggs carried on any one trip will be broken during the trip. The individual considers two strategies: Strategy 1: Take all 12 eggs in one trip. Strategy 2: Take two trips with 6 in each trip. a. List the possible outcomes of each strategy and the probabilities of these outcomes. Show that on the average, 6 eggs will remain unbroken after the trip home under either strategy. b. Develop a graph to show the utility obtainable under each strategy. Which strategy will be preferable? c. Could utility be improved further by taking more than two trips? How would this possi bility be affected if additional trips were costly?

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