Suppose an economy is characterized by a linear production possibility function for its two goods \((X \text { and } Y)\) of the form \\[ X+2 Y=180 \\] There are two individuals in this economy, each with an identical utility function for \(X\) and \(Y\) of the form \\[ \boldsymbol{U}(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Y})=\sqrt{\boldsymbol{X} \boldsymbol{Y}} \\] a. Suppose \(Y\) production is set at \(10 .\) What would the utility possibility frontier for this economy be? b. Suppose \(Y\) production is set at \(30 .\) What would the utility possibility frontier be? c. How should \(Y\) production be chosen so as to ensure the "best" utility possibility frontier? d. Under what conditions (contrary to those of this problem) might your answer to part (c) depend on the point on the utility possibility frontier being considered?

Short Answer

Expert verified
a. (60, 60) b. (40, 40) c. (63.6, 63.6) d. (90, 45)

Step by step solution

01

Substitute Y production value in production possibility function

We are given that the production of Y is fixed at 10. We plug this value into the production possibility function: \[X + 2(10) = 180\]
02

Calculate X production

Solving for X: \[X = 180 - 20 = 160\]
03

Determine the utility of both individuals

Now we have the production levels for X and Y. We can use these values to find the utility for each individual with the given utility function: \[U(X, Y) = \sqrt{XY}\] \[U(160, 10) = \sqrt{160*10} = \sqrt{1600} = 40 \] So, the utility possibility frontier with Y production set at 10 is (40, 40). #b. Utility possibility frontier with Y production at 30#
04

Substitute Y production value in production possibility function

We are now given that the production of Y is fixed at 30. We plug this value into the production possibility function: \[X + 2(30) = 180\]
05

Calculate X production

Solving for X: \[X = 180 - 60 = 120\]
06

Determine the utility of both individuals

Now we have the production levels for X and Y. We can use these values to find the utility for each individual with the given utility function: \[U(120, 30) = \sqrt{120*30} = \sqrt{3600} = 60 \] So, the utility possibility frontier with Y production set at 30 is (60, 60). #c. Optimal Y production level for the best utility possibility frontier#
07

Formulate the optimization problem

We need to maximize the utility function with respect to Y production, subject to the linear production possibility constraint: Maximize \(U(X, Y) = \sqrt{XY}\) Subject to \(X + 2Y = 180\)
08

Substitute the production function into the utility function

Solving the production function for X, we get: \(X = 180 - 2Y\) Now, substitute this expression into the utility function: \[U(180-2Y, Y) =\sqrt{(180 - 2Y)Y}\]
09

Calculate the first order condition

Differentiate the utility function with respect to Y: \[ \frac{dU}{dY} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{180Y - 2Y^2 - 180Y + 2Y^2}{\sqrt{(180 - 2Y)Y}} = 0 \] Setting the first order condition equal to zero and simplifying the equation, we get: \[Y = 45\]
10

Calculate the optimal X production level

Now that we have the optimal Y production, we can find the optimal X production by plugging Y value back into the production possibility function: \[X + 2(45) = 180\] \[X = 180 - 90 = 90\]
11

Determine the optimal utility possibility frontier

With the optimal production levels of X and Y, we can calculate the utility possibility frontier: \[U(90, 45) = \sqrt{90*45} = \sqrt{4050} ≈ 63.6\] The optimal Y production is 45, resulting in the best utility possibility frontier of (63.6, 63.6). #d. Conditions for different optimal production choices# The answer to part (c) may depend on the point on the utility possibility frontier being considered in cases where: 1. The utility functions of the individuals are not identical. 2. The production possibility frontier is not linear. 3. There are external factors such as differing preferences or the presence of public goods that influence the optimal production decision and utility levels. In these situations, the optimal production choice may vary depending on the individual's preferences or external factors, and it may not be possible to find a single optimal production choice to maximize the utility possibility frontier.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose voters based their decisions on the ratio of utilities received from two candidates that is, Equation 25.6 would be \\[ \boldsymbol{\pi}_{i}=f_{i}\left[\left(U_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}\right) / U_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{2}\right)\right]\right. \\] Show that the results from a game involving net value platforms would in this case maximize the Nash Social Welfare function \\[ \boldsymbol{S W}=\prod_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{U}_{i} \\]

Suppose there are two individuals in an economy. Utilities of those individuals under five possible social states are shown in the following table: $$\begin{array}{ccc} \text { State } & \text { Utility 1 } & \text { Utility 2 } \\ \hline \mathrm{A} & 50 & 50 \\ \mathrm{B} & 70 & 40 \\ \mathrm{C} & 45 & 54 \\ \mathrm{D} & 53 & 50.5 \\ \mathrm{E} & 30 & 84 \\ \hline \end{array}$$ Individuals do not know which number \((1 \text { or } 2)\) they will be assigned when the economy begins operating, hence they are uncertain about the actual utility they will receive under the alternative social states. Which social state will be preferred if an individual adopts the following strategies in his or her voting behavior to deal with this uncertainty? a. Choose that state which ensures the highest utility to the least well-off person. b. Assume there is a \(50-50\) chance of being either individual and choose that state with the highest expected utility. c. Assume that no matter what, the odds are always unfavorable such that there is a 60 percent chance of having the lower utility and a 40 percent chance of higher utility in any social state. Choose the state with the highest expected utility given these probabilities. d. Assume there is a \(50-50\) chance of being assigned either number and that each individual dislikes inequality, Fach will choose that state for which expected utility \(-\left|U_{1}-U_{2}\right|\) is as large as possible (where the \(|\ldots|\) notation denotes absolute value). e. What do you conclude from this problem about social choices under a "veil of ignorance" as to an individual's specific identity in society?

There are 200 pounds of food that must be allocated between two sailors marooned on an island. The utility function of the first sailor is given by \\[ \text { utility }=\sqrt{F_{1}} \\] where \(F_{1}\) is the quantity of food consumed by the first sailor. For the second sailor, utility (as a function of his food consumption) is given by \\[ \text { utility }=\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{F_{2}} \\] a. If the food is allocated equally between the sailors, how much utility will each receive? b. How should food be allocated between the sailors to ensure equality of utility? c. How should food be allocated so as to maximize the sum of the sailors' utilities? d. Suppose sailor 2 requires a utility level of at least 5 to remain alive. How should food be allocated so as to maximize the sum of utilities subject to the constraint that sailor 2 receive that minimum level of utility? e. Suppose both sailors agree on a social welfare function of the form \\[ W=U_{1}^{/ 2} U_{2}^{1 / 2} \\] How should food be allocated between the sailors so as to maximize social welfare?

Suppose seven individuals constitute a society in which individuals cast votes for their most preferred social arrangement and that the arrangement with the greatest number of votes is always chosen. Devise an example of individual rankings of the three states \(A, B,\) and \(C\) such that state \(A\) is chosen when all three states are available but that state \(B\) is chosen if the "irrelevant" alternative \(C\) is not available. (This amounts to showing that the constitution of this society does not obey Axiom 4 in Arrow's list.) How reasonable is your example? What does it indicate about the nature of Arrow's axiom?

How does the free rider problem arise in the decision of eligible voters to vote? How might voter participation decisions affect median voter results? How might it affect probabilistic voting models?

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