How does the free rider problem arise in the decision of eligible voters to vote? How might voter participation decisions affect median voter results? How might it affect probabilistic voting models?

Short Answer

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Answer: The free rider problem affects the median voter results by potentially distorting the representation of the electorate's preferences, as non-voting groups may possess different political preferences compared to voting groups. This can lead to political outcomes that do not align with the true desires of the population. In probabilistic voting models, the free rider problem can impact their predictive accuracy, as a large number of potential voters abstaining from voting would lead to input data not fully representing the entire electorate. Consequently, this could result in misinterpretation of election data and misinformed policy decisions based on inaccurate model predictions.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding the Free Rider Problem

The free rider problem occurs when individuals benefit from a good or service without contributing to the cost of providing it. In the context of voting, the free rider problem arises because eligible voters enjoy the benefits of living in a democracy yet may not participate in elections. This could be attributed to the fact that the likelihood of a single vote affecting the outcome of an election is low. Consequently, some individuals may choose not to vote while still benefiting from the democratic process.
02

Voter Participation and Median Voter Results

When it comes to voter participation, the median voter theorem suggests that politicians will adapt their positions to appeal to the median voter, who represents the middle of the ideological spectrum. If a significant number of eligible voters choose not to vote due to the free rider problem, it can distort the median voter results. Specifically, if the non-voting group possesses a different political preference than the voting group, the median voter may not accurately reflect the true preferences of the overall population. As a result, the political outcomes might not represent the preferences of the society as a whole but rather the preferences of a smaller subset of voters who actually participated in the elections.
03

Voter Participation and Probabilistic Voting Models

Probabilistic voting models take into account the uncertainty associated with voter behavior and preferences. In these models, each voter supports a candidate with a certain probability, which depends on the individual’s preferences and the positions of can.\]idates. The free rider problem may also impact the predictive accuracy of probabilistic voting models. If a large number of potential voters abstain from voting due to the free rider problem, the probabilistic voting model may not accurately predict the outcome of an election. This is because the input data, which consists of voter preferences and behaviors, would not fully represent the entire electorate. Consequently, this could lead to misinterpretation of election data and misinformed policy decisions based on inaccurate model predictions. In conclusion, the free rider problem can have significant consequences on both the median voter results and probabilistic voting models. The non-participation of potential voters can distort the representation of the electorate's preferences, potentially leading to political outcomes that do not align with the true desires of the population. This highlights the importance of understanding the consequences of the free rider problem in democratic decision-making.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose an economy is characterized by a linear production possibility function for its two goods \((X \text { and } Y)\) of the form \\[ X+2 Y=180 \\] There are two individuals in this economy, each with an identical utility function for \(X\) and \(Y\) of the form \\[ \boldsymbol{U}(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Y})=\sqrt{\boldsymbol{X} \boldsymbol{Y}} \\] a. Suppose \(Y\) production is set at \(10 .\) What would the utility possibility frontier for this economy be? b. Suppose \(Y\) production is set at \(30 .\) What would the utility possibility frontier be? c. How should \(Y\) production be chosen so as to ensure the "best" utility possibility frontier? d. Under what conditions (contrary to those of this problem) might your answer to part (c) depend on the point on the utility possibility frontier being considered?

Suppose voters based their decisions on the ratio of utilities received from two candidates that is, Equation 25.6 would be \\[ \boldsymbol{\pi}_{i}=f_{i}\left[\left(U_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}\right) / U_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{2}\right)\right]\right. \\] Show that the results from a game involving net value platforms would in this case maximize the Nash Social Welfare function \\[ \boldsymbol{S W}=\prod_{i=1}^{n} \boldsymbol{U}_{i} \\]

Suppose seven individuals constitute a society in which individuals cast votes for their most preferred social arrangement and that the arrangement with the greatest number of votes is always chosen. Devise an example of individual rankings of the three states \(A, B,\) and \(C\) such that state \(A\) is chosen when all three states are available but that state \(B\) is chosen if the "irrelevant" alternative \(C\) is not available. (This amounts to showing that the constitution of this society does not obey Axiom 4 in Arrow's list.) How reasonable is your example? What does it indicate about the nature of Arrow's axiom?

Suppose there are two individuals in an economy. Utilities of those individuals under five possible social states are shown in the following table: $$\begin{array}{ccc} \text { State } & \text { Utility 1 } & \text { Utility 2 } \\ \hline \mathrm{A} & 50 & 50 \\ \mathrm{B} & 70 & 40 \\ \mathrm{C} & 45 & 54 \\ \mathrm{D} & 53 & 50.5 \\ \mathrm{E} & 30 & 84 \\ \hline \end{array}$$ Individuals do not know which number \((1 \text { or } 2)\) they will be assigned when the economy begins operating, hence they are uncertain about the actual utility they will receive under the alternative social states. Which social state will be preferred if an individual adopts the following strategies in his or her voting behavior to deal with this uncertainty? a. Choose that state which ensures the highest utility to the least well-off person. b. Assume there is a \(50-50\) chance of being either individual and choose that state with the highest expected utility. c. Assume that no matter what, the odds are always unfavorable such that there is a 60 percent chance of having the lower utility and a 40 percent chance of higher utility in any social state. Choose the state with the highest expected utility given these probabilities. d. Assume there is a \(50-50\) chance of being assigned either number and that each individual dislikes inequality, Fach will choose that state for which expected utility \(-\left|U_{1}-U_{2}\right|\) is as large as possible (where the \(|\ldots|\) notation denotes absolute value). e. What do you conclude from this problem about social choices under a "veil of ignorance" as to an individual's specific identity in society?

There are 200 pounds of food that must be allocated between two sailors marooned on an island. The utility function of the first sailor is given by \\[ \text { utility }=\sqrt{F_{1}} \\] where \(F_{1}\) is the quantity of food consumed by the first sailor. For the second sailor, utility (as a function of his food consumption) is given by \\[ \text { utility }=\frac{1}{2} \sqrt{F_{2}} \\] a. If the food is allocated equally between the sailors, how much utility will each receive? b. How should food be allocated between the sailors to ensure equality of utility? c. How should food be allocated so as to maximize the sum of the sailors' utilities? d. Suppose sailor 2 requires a utility level of at least 5 to remain alive. How should food be allocated so as to maximize the sum of utilities subject to the constraint that sailor 2 receive that minimum level of utility? e. Suppose both sailors agree on a social welfare function of the form \\[ W=U_{1}^{/ 2} U_{2}^{1 / 2} \\] How should food be allocated between the sailors so as to maximize social welfare?

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