Reconsider the common resource problem given in Example \(18.7 .\) Suppose that crawfish popularity continues to increase, and that the demand curve shifts from \(C=0.401-0.0064 F\) to \(C=0.50-0.0064 F\) How does this shift in demand affect the actual crawfish catch, the efficient catch, and the social cost of common access? (Hint: Use the marginal social cost and private cost curves given in the example.)

Short Answer

Expert verified
This shift in demand leads to an increase in both the actual and efficient crawfish catch, due to higher willingness to pay. However, it also generates a larger social cost due to overconsumption.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding the initial demand price function and quantity function

The initial demand function for crawfish was \(C=0.401-0.0064F\), where C is the price of crawfish and F is the number of crawfish caught.
02

Understanding the new demand function

Due to an increase in popularity, the demand curve shifts upwards to \(C=0.50-0.0064F\). This suggests that the price people are willing to pay for crawfish has increased, while the quantity demanded decreases with F.
03

Calculating changes in crawfish catch

To find the actual catch, this will be where the new demand equals to the private cost. Equate both equations given in the example and solve for F.
04

Efficient Catch Calculation

The efficient catch is where demand equals to the social cost. Equate the given social cost equation to the new demand equation and solve for F.
05

Impact on the social cost

The social cost can be found by comparing the actual catch and the efficient catch. The increased demand curve means people are willing to pay more for the same quantity, implying an increased consumption which leads to an increase in social cost.

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