Many retail video stores offer two alternative plans for renting films: \(\bullet\) A two-part tariff: Pay an annual membership fee (e.g., \(\$ 40\) ) and then pay a small fee for the daily rental of each film (e.g., \(\$ 2\) per film per day). \(\bullet\) A straight rental fee: Pay no membership fee, but pay a higher daily rental fee (e.g., \$4 per film per day What is the logic behind the two-part tariff in this case? Why offer the customer a choice of two plans rather than simply a two-part tariff?

Short Answer

Expert verified
The two-part tariff pricing strategy capitalizes on frequent users by charging a membership and a smaller per-unit fee. Meanwhile, the straight rental fee caters to less frequent users who would prefer to avoid a membership fee. Offering both plans allows the video rental store to cater to customers with different consuming patterns and maximize its revenue.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding Two-Part Tariff

A two-part tariff is a pricing strategy where the price of a product or service is composed of two parts - a lump-sum fee as well as a per-unit charge. In the given example, the annual membership fee (\$40) is the lump-sum fee and the small fee for the daily rental of each film (\$2 per film per day) is the per-unit charge. This tariff thus directly relates to the consumption and rewards frequent users.
02

Understanding Straight Rental Fee

The straight rental fee doesn’t require any membership fee but requires a higher daily rental fee, \$4 per film per day. This tariff is more flexible and ideal for casual users who do not consume frequently enough to justify the membership fee.
03

Logic Behind Two-Part Tariff and the Choice

The logic behind the two-part tariff is to gain revenue from both high-demand consumers (who rent frequently and are willing to pay the membership fee for a lower per-unit cost) and low-demand consumers (who do not rent as frequently and hence prefer to avoid the membership fee but pay a higher daily rental fee). Offering a choice of plans rather than just a two-part tariff allows the store to cater to a wider range of consumers with varying consumption patterns, thereby maximizing its total revenue.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Microeconomics and Two-Part Tariff
Microeconomics, the branch of economics dealing with the behavior of individuals and firms in making decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources, provides the foundational concepts for analyzing pricing strategies such as the two-part tariff. It examines how these parties interact within the market to influence the supply and demand for goods and services.

Within the microeconomic framework, a two-part tariff is an ingenious way to segment the market based on consumer usage patterns. Stores offering two-part tariffs are engaging in price discrimination, which is a way to charge different prices to different customers for essentially the same good. In the example given, customers with a high demand for movie rentals may opt for the annual membership to minimize their total costs, while low-demand customers might choose to pay per rental.

This segmentation allows the business to capture more consumer surplus, which is the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and what they actually pay. The membership fee serves as a way to ensure a base level of revenue from frequent renters, while occasional renters contribute through higher per-unit costs.
Pricing Strategies
Pricing strategies are central to a company's profitability and can include a variety of approaches, such as cost-based pricing, competition-based pricing, and value-based pricing. The two-part tariff is a clever pricing strategy that can be likened to a form of value-based pricing where customers choose the payment plan that offers them the best perceived value for their specific needs.

In the context of the video store example, the two-part tariff maximizes the store's profits by offering two distinct options. Frequent renters might value the annual membership because it reduces their average cost per movie over time. Conversely, casual renters are more likely to prefer the straight rental fee without any commitment, accepting a higher cost per movie as a trade-off for flexibility.

The strategy employed here also leverages consumer's willingness to pay, a fundamental concept in microeconomics. By providing different payment options, the video store ensures it is not excluding any potential customer based on their consumption patterns, thus optimizing its reach within the market.
Consumer Choice Theory
Consumer choice theory explores how consumers make decisions to spend their money based on preferences for certain goods and services, often facing trade-offs due to budget constraints. When presented with a two-part tariff, consumers will assess their usage patterns and evaluate which option gives them the most utility, or satisfaction, for their money.

In applying consumer choice theory to the two-part tariff, individuals are rational decision-makers who aim to maximize their utility. They will weigh the initial membership fee against their expected number of rentals. If the sum of the membership fee and the total rental fees (at the member price) is less than what they would pay under the straight rental fee option, they are likely to choose the two-part tariff.

By offering a choice, the video store acknowledges that different consumers have different utility curves and budget constraints. The goal with such a strategy is to create a win-win situation where the store increases its revenue while consumers feel they have made a choice that maximizes their individual preferences and constraints.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

You are an executive for Super Computer, Inc. (SC), which rents out super computers. SC receives a fixed rental payment per time period in exchange for the right to unlimited computing at a rate of \(P\) cents per second. SC has two types of potential customers of equal number -10 businesses and 10 academic institutions. Each business customer has the demand function \(Q=10-P,\) where \(Q\) is in millions of seconds per month; each academic institution has the demand \(Q=8-P .\) The marginal cost to SC of additional computing is 2 cents per second, regardless of volume. a. Suppose that you could separate business and academic customers. What rental fee and usage fee would you charge each group? What would be your profits? b. Suppose you were unable to keep the two types of customers separate and charged a zero rental fee. What usage fee would maximize your profits? What would be your profits? c. Suppose you set up one two-part tariff- -that is, you set one rental and one usage fee that both business and academic customers pay. What usage and rental fees would you set? What would be your profits? Explain why price would not be equal to marginal cost.

Suppose that BMW can produce any quantity of cars at a constant marginal cost equal to \(\$ 20,000\) and a fixed cost of \(\$ 10\) billion. You are asked to advise the CEO as to what prices and quantities BMW should set for sales in Europe and in the United States. The demand for BMWs in each market is given by $$Q_{E}=4,000,000-100 P_{E}$$ and $$Q_{u}=1,000,000-20 P_{u}$$ where the subscript \(E\) denotes Europe, the subscript \(U\) denotes the United States. Assume that BMW can restrict U.S. sales to authorized BMW dealers only. a. What quantity of BMWs should the firm sell in each market, and what should the price be in each market? What should the total profit be? b. If \(\mathrm{BMW}\) were forced to charge the same price in each market, what would be the quantity sold in each market, the equilibrium price, and the company's profit?

If the demand for drive-in movies is more elastic for couples than for single individuals, it will be optimal for theaters to charge one admission fee for the driver of the car and an extra fee for passengers. True or false? Explain.

Elizabeth Airlines (EA) flies only one route: ChicagoHonolulu. The demand for each flight is \(Q=500-P\) EA's cost of running each flight is \(\$ 30,000\) plus \(\$ 100\) per passenger. a. What is the profit-maximizing price that EA will charge? How many people will be on each flight? What is EA's profit for each flight? b. EA learns that the fixed costs per flight are in fact \(\$ 41,000\) instead of \(\$ 30,000 .\) Will the airline stay in business for long? Illustrate your answer using a graph of the demand curve that EA faces, EA's average cost curve when fixed costs are \(\$ 30,000,\) and \(\mathrm{EA}^{\prime}\) s average cost curve when fixed costs are \(\$ 41,000\) c. Wait! EA finds out that two different types of people fly to Honolulu. Type \(A\) consists of business people with a demand of \(Q_{A}=260-0.4 P\). Type \(B\) consists of students whose total demand is \(Q_{B}=240-0.6 P\) Because the students are easy to spot, EA decides to charge them different prices. Graph each of these demand curves and their horizontal sum. What price does EA charge the students? What price does it charge other customers? How many of each type are on each flight? d. What would EA's profit be for each flight? Would the airline stay in business? Calculate the consumer surplus of each consumer group. What is the total consumer surplus? e. Before EA started price discriminating, how much consumer surplus was the Type \(A\) demand getting from air travel to Honolulu? Type \(B\) ? Why did total consumer surplus decline with price discrimination, even though total quantity sold remained unchanged?

As the owner of the only tennis club in an isolated wealthy community, you must decide on membership dues and fees for court time. There are two types of tennis players. "Serious" players have demand $$Q_{1}=10-P$$ where \(Q_{1}\) is court hours per week and \(P\) is the fee per hour for each individual player. There are also "occasional" players with demand $$Q_{2}=4-0.25 P$$Assume that there are 1000 players of each type. Because you have plenty of courts, the marginal cost of court time is zero. You have fixed costs of \(\$ 10,000\) per week. Serious and occasional players look alike, so you must charge them the same prices. a. Suppose that to maintain a "professional" atmosphere, you want to limit membership to serious players. How should you set the annual membership dues and court fees (assume 52 weeks per year) to maximize profits, keeping in mind the constraint that only serious players choose to join? What would profits be (per week)? b. A friend tells you that you could make greater profits by encouraging both types of players to join. Is your friend right? What annual dues and court fees would maximize weekly profits? What would these profits be? c. Suppose that over the years, young, upwardly mobile professionals move to your community, all of whom are serious players. You believe there are now 3000 serious players and 1000 occasional players. Would it still be profitable to cater to the occasional player? What would be the profitmaximizing annual dues and court fees? What would profits be per week?

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