Price discrimination requires the ability to sort customers and the ability to prevent arbitrage. Explain how the following can function as price discrimination schemes and discuss both sorting and arbitrage:

  1. Requiring airline travelers to spend at least one Saturday night away from home to qualify for a low fare.

  2. Insisting on delivering cement to buyers and basing prices on buyers’ locations.

  3. Selling food processors along with coupons that can be sent to the manufacturer for a $10 rebate.

  4. Offering temporary price cuts on bathroom tissue.

  5. Charging high-income patients more than low-income patients for plastic surgery

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. The arbitrage is not possible when a particular customer is considered.

  2. The sorting is possible based on location.

  3. The arbitrage is possible as the food processors can be sold below the retail price.

  4. Arbitrage is possible, but the cost of arbitrage is high.

  5. The arbitrage is not possible as it is difficult to transfer the plastic surgery.

Step by step solution

01

Step 1. Explanation for part (a)

The tourist has no urgency and makes travel plans generally on weekends, whereas it is difficult for business travellers to stay on the weekends. Thus, a particular customer name will be mentioned; hence, there is no space for arbitrage.

02

Step 2. Explanation for part (b)

The consumers are sorted based on geography by basing the price buyers’ location. The cement price includes the transportation charges paid by the consumer, whether the delivery location buyers’ place or the sellers’ place. The pricing strategy is called basing-point pricing; all the sellers use the same point to calculate the transportation cost. Hence, every seller changes the same price.

03

Step 3. Explanation for part (c)

The rebate is possible only when the consumer sends the form of rebate to the manufacturer. The consumer with less price-sensitive does not fill the form for the rebate, and the consumer with more price-sensitive does fill the form for rebate. The group of consumers who fill the form has an opportunity to sell the food processors below the retail price after receiving the rebate.

04

Step 4. Explanation for part (d)

The temporary price cut on the bathroom tissues is intertemporal price discrimination. The consumer with less price sensitivity will not change their demand, but the more price sensitivity will increase their demand. Here arbitrage is possible, but the profit from the arbitrage process will be very small as it requires a high cost of storing, transportation, and resale.

05

Step 5. Explanation for part (e)

Segregating the patients between high-income and low-income is very difficult for the doctor, as the doctor can only guess. The doctor can initially impose a high price, and gradually the patients will negotiate depending on their income level. Thus, plastic surgery cannot shift from low-income to high-income patients; hence, arbitrage is impossible.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

You are selling two goods, 1 and 2, to a market consisting of three consumers with reservation prices as follows:

RESERVATION PRICE (\()

CONSUMER FOR 1 FOR 2

A 20 100

B 60 60

C 100 20

The unit cost of each product is \)30.

a. Compute the optimal prices and profits for (i) selling the goods separately, (ii) pure bundling, and (iii) mixed bundling.

b. Which strategy would be most profitable? Why?

Your firm produces two products, the demands for which are independent. Both products are produced at zero marginal cost. You face four consumers (or groups of consumers) with the following reservation prices:

CONSUMER GOOD 1(\() GOOD 2(\))

A 25 100

B 40 80

C 80 40

D 100 25

a. Consider three alternative pricing strategies: (i) selling the goods separately; (ii) pure bundling; (iii) mixed bundling. For each strategy, determine the optimal prices to be charged and the resulting profits. Which strategy would be best?

b. Now suppose that the production of each good entails a marginal cost of $30. How does this information change your answers to (a)? Why is the optimal strategy now different?

Suppose that two competing firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of MC = \(50. Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium.

(a) Because Firm A must increase wages, its MC increases to \)80.

(b) The marginal cost of both firms increases.

(c) The demand curve shifts to the right.

You are an executive for Super Computer, Inc. (SC), which rents out supercomputers. SC receives a fixed rental payment per time period in exchange for the right to unlimited computing at a rate of P cents per second. SC has two types of potential customers of equal number—10 businesses and 10 academic institutions. Each business customer has the demand function Q = 10 - P, where Q is in millions of seconds per month; each academic institution has the demand Q = 8 - P. The marginal cost to SC of additional computing is 2 cents per second, regardless of volume.

  1. Suppose that you could separate business and academic customers. What rental fee and usage fee would you charge each group? What would be your profits?
  2. Suppose you were unable to keep the two types of customers separate and charged a zero rental fee. What usage fee would maximize your profits? What would be your profits?
  3. Suppose you set up one two-part tariff—that is, you set one rental and one usage fee that both business and academic customers pay. What usage and rental fees would you set? What would be your profits? Explain why the price would not be equal to marginal cost.

Many retail video stores offer two alternative plans for renting films:

• A two-part tariff: Pay an annual membership fee (e.g., \(40) and then pay a small fee for the daily rental of each film (e.g., \)2 per film per day).

• A straight rental fee: Pay no membership fee, but pay a higher daily rental fee (e.g., $4 per film per day).

What is the logic behind the two-part tariff in this case? Why offer the customer a choice of two plans rather than simply a two-part tariff?

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