As the owner of the only tennis club in an isolated wealthy community, you must decide on membership dues and fees for court time. There are two types of tennis players. “Serious” players have demand

Q1 - 10 - P

where Q1 is court hours per week and P is the fee per hour for each individual player. There are also “occasional” players with demand

Q2 = 4 - 0.25P

Assume that there are 1000 players of each type. Because you have plenty of courts, the marginal cost of court time is zero. You have fixed costs of $10,000 per week. Serious and occasional players look alike, so you must charge them the same prices.

  1. Suppose that to maintain a “professional” atmosphere, you want to limit membership to serious players. How should you set the annual membership dues and court fees (assume 52 weeks per year) to maximize profits, keeping in mind the constraint that only serious players choose to join? What would profits be (per week)?
  2. A friend tells you that you could make greater profits by encouraging both types of players to join. Is your friend right? What annual dues and court fees would maximize weekly profits? What would these profits be?
  3. Suppose that over the years, young, upwardly mobile professionals move to your community, all of whom are serious players. You believe there are now 3000 serious players and 1000 occasional players. Would it still be profitable to cater to the occasional player? What would be the profit-maximizing annual dues and court fees? What would profits be per week?

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. The annual membership fee will be $2600, and the court fee will be zero. The total profit will be $40,000.
  2. Yes, your friend is right. The annual dues will be $1098.5, and the court fee will be $3. The total profit will be $63,000.
  3. The annual dues will be $1053, and the court fee will be $3.27. the total profit will be $147,455.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation for part (a)

The club owner will change the membership fee equal to the serious player's consumer surplus. The consumer surplus of serious players will be:

Q1=10-PMC=0CS=0.510-010-0=0.5×10×10=$50=$2,600peryear

Thus, the annual entry fee will be $2,600. The court fee is zero.

The total profit will be:

π=501000-10,000=50,000-10,000=$40,000

The total profit will be $40,000 per week.

02

Explanation for part (b)

If there are both types of players, the club owner will be profitable by setting the court fee above the marginal cost and annual fee equal to the consumer surplus of the type of player with less demand.

The annual fee (T) will be:

T = 0.5Q216 - P= 0.54 - 0.25P16 - P= 32 - 4P + 0.125P2

The total annual fee will be:

TA= 200032 - 4P + 0.125P2= 64,000 - 8,000P + 250P2

Total revenue from court fee will be:

TR = P1,00010 - P+ 10004 - 0.25P= 14,000P - 1250P2

The total revenue from the annual fee and court fee will be:

TR = 64,000 + 6000P - 1000P2

The maximum TR will be:

dTRdP= 6000 - 200P = 0P = $ 3

The demand for both the players will be:

Q1= 10 - 3= 7Q2= 4 - 0.253= 3.25

The profit will be:

TR=64,000+60003-10003=$73,000perweekπ=73,000-10,000=$63,000

The profit is greater than when the only serious player was a member. Thus, your friend is right.

03

Explanation for part (c)

There are 4,000 players; then the entry fee will be:

T = 400032 - 4P + 0.125P2= 128,000 - 16,000P + 500P2

The court fee will be:

P3000Q1+ 1000Q2= P300010 - P+ 10004 - 0.25P= 24,000 - 2350P2

The total revenue will be:

TR=128,000+18000P-2750P2dTRdP=18,000-5500P=0P=$3.27perhour

The total profit will be,

TR=128,000+18,0003.27-27503.27=$157,455π=157,455-10,000=$147,455

The annual dues will be:

5232 - 43.27+ 0.1253.272= $ 1053

The annual profit will be,

52147.455= $ 7.67millionperyear

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Price discrimination requires the ability to sort customers and the ability to prevent arbitrage. Explain how the following can function as price discrimination schemes and discuss both sorting and arbitrage:

  1. Requiring airline travelers to spend at least one Saturday night away from home to qualify for a low fare.

  2. Insisting on delivering cement to buyers and basing prices on buyers’ locations.

  3. Selling food processors along with coupons that can be sent to the manufacturer for a $10 rebate.

  4. Offering temporary price cuts on bathroom tissue.

  5. Charging high-income patients more than low-income patients for plastic surgery

Sal’s satellite company broadcasts TV to subscribers in Los Angeles and New York. The demand functions for each of these two groups are

QNY = 60 - 0.25PNY

QLA = 100 - 0.50PLA

where Q is in thousands of subscriptions per year and P is the subscription price per year. The cost of providing Q units of service is given by

C = 1000 + 40Q

where Q = QNY + QLA.

  1. What are the profit-maximizing prices and quantities for the New York and Los Angeles markets?
  2. As a consequence of a new satellite that the Pentagon recently deployed, people in Los Angeles receive Sal’s New York broadcasts and people in New York receive Sal’s Los Angeles broadcasts. As a result, anyone in New York or Los Angeles can receive Sal’s broadcasts by subscribing in either city. Thus Sal can charge only a single price. What price should he charge, and what quantities will he sell in New York and Los Angeles?
  3. In which of the above situations, (a) or (b), is Sal better off? In terms of consumer surplus, which situation do people in New York prefer and which do people in Los Angeles prefer? Why?

Look again at Figure 11.17 (p. 438). Suppose that the marginal costs c1 and c2 were zero. Show that in this case, pure bundling, not mixed bundling, is the most profitable pricing strategy. What price should be charged for the bundle? What will the firm’s profit be?

Elizabeth Airlines (EA) flies only one route: Chicago–Honolulu. The demand for each flight is Q = 500 - P. EA’s cost of running each flight is \(30,000 plus \)100 per passenger.

  1. What is the profit-maximizing price that EA will charge? How many people will be on each flight? What is EA’s profit for each flight?
  2. EA learns that the fixed costs per flight are in fact \(41,000 instead of \)30,000. Will the airline stay in business for long? Illustrate your answer using a graph of the demand curve that EA faces, EA’s average cost curve when fixed costs are \(30,000, and EA’s average cost curve when fixed costs are \)41,000.
  3. Wait! EA finds out that two different types of people fly to Honolulu. Type A consists of business people with a demand of QA = 260 - 0.4P. Type B consists of students whose total demand is QB = 240 - 0.6P. Because the students are easy to spot, EA decides to charge them different prices. Graph each of these demand curves and their horizontal sum. What price does EA charge the students? What price does it charge other customers? How many of each type are on each flight?
  4. What would EA’s profit be for each flight? Would the airline stay in business? Calculate the consumer surplus of each consumer group. What is the total consumer surplus?
  5. Before EA started price discriminating, how much consumer surplus was the Type A demand getting from air travel to Honolulu? Type B? Why did total consumer surplus decline with price discrimination, even though total quantity sold remained unchanged?

A cable TV company offers, in addition to its basic service, two products: a Sports Channel (Product 1) and a Movie Channel (Product 2). Subscribers to the basic service can subscribe to these additional services individually at the monthly prices P1 and P2, respectively, or they can buy the two as a bundle for the price PB, where PB 6 P1 + P2. They can also forgo the additional services and simply buy the basic service. The company’s marginal cost for these additional services is zero. Through market research, the cable company has estimated the reservation prices for these two services for a representative group of consumers in the company’s service area. These reservation prices are plotted (as x’s) in Figure 11.21, as are the prices P1, P2, and PB that the cable company is currently charging. The graph is divided into regions I, II, III, and IV.

a. Which products, if any, will be purchased by the consumers in region I? In region II? In region III? In region IV? Explain briefly.

b. Note that as drawn in the figure, the reservation prices for the Sports Channel and the Movie Channel are negatively correlated. Why would you, or why would you not, expect consumers’ reservation prices for cable TV channels to be negatively correlated?

c. The company’s vice president has said: “Because the marginal cost of providing an additional channel is zero, mixed bundling offers no advantage over pure bundling. Our profits would be just as high if we offered the Sports Channel and the

Movie Channel together as a bundle, and only as a bundle.” Do you agree or disagree? Explain why.

d. Suppose the cable company continues to use mixed bundling to sell these two services. Based on the distribution of reservation prices shown in Figure 11.21, do you think the cable company should alter any of the prices that it is now charging? If so, how?

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