In Example 11.1 (page 422), we saw how producers of processed foods and related consumer goods use coupons as a means of price discrimination. Although coupons are widely used in the United States, that is not the case in other countries. In Germany, coupons are illegal.

  1. Does prohibiting the use of coupons in Germany make German consumers better off or worse off?

  2. Does prohibiting the use of coupons make German producers better off or worse off?

Short Answer

Expert verified
  1. German consumers can be better or worse off after prohibiting coupons.

  2. German producers will be worse off on prohibiting coupons.

Step by step solution

01

Step 1. Explanation for part (a)

The consumer may be better or worse off depending on the price and demand as the total surplus may increase or decrease with the price discrimination. Let us suppose that a company sells a box of cereal at $5 and 2,000,000 boxes are sold per week. If a coupon of $1 is offered per box it results in an increase in the number of boxes of cereal sold, to 2,500,000 per week. It means the consumer demand and surplus have increased. Consumers will be worse off when the coupons are prohibited.

Let us suppose that the price of cereal increases to $5.5. With the price increase, there will be a reduction in demand if the after-coupon price is higher than the initial situation. Some consumers will also continue to purchase cereals without coupon. Some consumers will redeem the coupon, and the price will be $4.5; thus, the consumer surplus increases for one group and decreases for another. Hence, the total consumer surplus may increase or decrease. Thus, the German consumer may be better off or worse off on prohibiting coupons.

02

Step 2. Explanation for part (b)

The German producer will be worse off but not better off after prohibiting the coupons. The producer uses the coupons only if they profit; thus, those producers will be worse off; and the producers who do not use coupons will have no effect.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose that two competing firms, A and B, produce a homogeneous good. Both firms have a marginal cost of MC = \(50. Describe what would happen to output and price in each of the following situations if the firms are at (i) Cournot equilibrium, (ii) collusive equilibrium, and (iii) Bertrand equilibrium.

(a) Because Firm A must increase wages, its MC increases to \)80.

(b) The marginal cost of both firms increases.

(c) The demand curve shifts to the right.

Consider a firm with monopoly power that faces the demand curve

P= 100 - 3Q+ 4A1/2

and has the total cost function

C= 4Q2 + 10Q+ A

where Ais the level of advertising expenditures, and Pand Qare price and output.

a.Find the values of A, Q, and Pthat maximize the firm’s profit.

b.Calculate the Lerner index, L = (P - MC)/P, for this firm at its profit-maximizing levels of A, Q, and P.

Price discrimination requires the ability to sort customers and the ability to prevent arbitrage. Explain how the following can function as price discrimination schemes and discuss both sorting and arbitrage:

  1. Requiring airline travelers to spend at least one Saturday night away from home to qualify for a low fare.

  2. Insisting on delivering cement to buyers and basing prices on buyers’ locations.

  3. Selling food processors along with coupons that can be sent to the manufacturer for a $10 rebate.

  4. Offering temporary price cuts on bathroom tissue.

  5. Charging high-income patients more than low-income patients for plastic surgery

Look again at Figure 11.17 (p. 438). Suppose that the marginal costs c1 and c2 were zero. Show that in this case, pure bundling, not mixed bundling, is the most profitable pricing strategy. What price should be charged for the bundle? What will the firm’s profit be?

A monopolist is deciding how to allocate output between two geographically separated markets (East Coast and Midwest). Demand and marginal revenue for the two markets are

P1 = 15 – Q1 MR1 = 15 - 2Q1

P2 = 25 - 2Q2 MR2 = 25 - 4Q2

The monopolist’s total cost is C = 5 + 3(Q1 + Q2). What are price, output, profits, marginal revenues, and deadweight loss (i) if the monopolist can price discriminate? (ii) if the law prohibits charging different prices in the two regions?

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