As the owner of a family farm whose wealth is \(250,000, you must choose between sitting this season out and investing last year’s earnings (\)200,000) in a safe money market fund paying 5.0 percent or planting summer corn. Planting costs \(200,000, with a six-month time to harvest. If there is rain, planting summer corn will yield \)500,000 in revenues at harvest. If there is a drought, planting will yield \(50,000 in revenues. As a third choice, you can purchase AgriCorp drought-resistant summer corn at a cost of \)250,000 that will yield \(500,000 in revenues at harvest if there is rain, and \)350,000 in revenues if there is a drought. You are risk-averse, and your preference for family wealth (W) is specified by the relationship U(W) = √W. The probability of summer drought is 0.30, while the probability of summer rain is 0.70. Which of the three options should you choose? Explain.

Short Answer

Expert verified

The first option of not planting the crop will be chosen.

Step by step solution

01

Explanation

The expected utility under the safe option is calculated below:

EU=250,000+200,0001+0.050.5=250,000+210,0000.5=460,0000.5=678.23

The expected utility under the corn plantation option is calculated below:

EU=0.7250000+500000-2000000.5+0.3250000+50000-2000000.5=0.7250000+3000000.5+0.3250000-1500000.5=0.75500000.5+0.31000000.5=0.7×741.62+0.3×316.23=519.134+94.869=614

The expected utility under the drought-resistant option is calculated below:

EU=0.7250000+500000-2500000.5+0.3250000+350000-2000000.5=0.7250000+2500000.5+0.3250000-1000000.5=0.75000000.5+0.33500000.5=0.7×707.11+0.3×591.61=494.977+177.483=672.46

The higher expected utility option will be chosen; thus, the first option will be chosen, i.e., not planting the corn.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose that Natasha’s utility function is given by u(I) = √110I, where I represents annual income in thousands of dollars.

a. Is Natasha risk loving, risk neutral, or risk averse? Explain.

b. Suppose that Natasha is currently earning an income of \(40,000 (I = 40) and can earn that income next year with certainty. She is offered a chance to take a new job that offers a .6 probability of earning \)44,000 and a .4 probability of earning $33,000. Should she take the new job?

c. In (b), would Natasha be willing to buy insurance to protect against the variable income associated with the new job? If so, how much would she be willing to pay for that insurance? (Hint: What is the risk premium?)

Draw a utility function over income u(I) that describes a man who is a risk lover when his income is low but risk-averse when his income is high. Can you explain why such a utility function might reasonably describe a person’s preferences?

Richard is deciding whether to buy a state lottery ticket. Each ticket costs \(1, and the probability of winning payoffs is given as follows:

PROBABILITY
RETURN
.5\)0.00
.25\(1.00
.2\)2.00
.05$7.50

a. What is the expected value of Richard's payoff if he buys a lottery ticket? What is the variance?

b. Richard's nickname is "No-Risk Rick" because he is an extremely risk-averse individual. Would he buy the ticket?

c. Richard has been given 1000 lottery tickets. Discuss how you would determine the smallest amount for which he would be willing to sell all 1000 tickets.

d. In the long run, given the price of the lottery tickets and the probability/return table, what do you think the state would do about the lottery?

Suppose an investor is concerned about a business choice in which there are three prospects—the probability and returns are given below:

PROBABILITY
RETURN
4\(100
3\)30
3-$30

What is the expected value of the uncertain investment? What is the variance.

A city is considering how much to spend to hire people to monitor its parking meters. The following information is available to the city manager:

  • Hiring each meter-monitor costs \(10,000 per year.

  • With one monitoring person hired, the probability of a driver getting a ticket each time he or she parks illegally is equal to .25.

  • With two monitors, the probability of getting a ticket is .5; with three monitors, the probability is .75; and with four, it's equal to 1.

  • With two monitors hired, the current fine for overtime parking is \)20.

  1. Assume first that all drivers are risk-neutral. What parking fine would you levy, and how many meter monitors would you hire (1, 2, 3, or 4) to achieve the current level of deterrence against illegal parking at the minimum cost?

  2. Now assume that drivers are highly risk-averse. How would your answer to (a) change?

  3. (For discussion) What if drivers could insure themselves against the risk of parking fines? Would it make good public policy to permit such insurance?

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