Chapter 10: Problem 10
Is a monopolistically competitive firm productively efficient? Is it allocatively efficient? Why or why not?
Chapter 10: Problem 10
Is a monopolistically competitive firm productively efficient? Is it allocatively efficient? Why or why not?
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Get started for freeWould you expect the kinked demand curve to be more extreme (like a right angle) or less extreme (like a normal demand curve) if each firm in the cartel produces a near-identical product like OPEC and petroleum? What if each firm produces a somewhat different product? Explain your reasoning.
Andrea's Day Spa began to offer a relaxing aromatherapy treatment. The firm asks you how much to charge to maximize profits. The first two columns in Table 10.5 provide the price and quantity for the demand curve for treatments. The third column shows its total costs. For each level of output, calculate total revenue, marginal revenue, average cost, and marginal cost. What is the profit-maximizing level of output for the treatments and how much will the firm earn in profits? $$\begin{array}{l|l|l}\hline {\text { Price }} & {\text { Quantity }} & {\text { TC }} \\\\\hline \$ 25.00 & 0 & \$ 130 \\\\\hline \$ 24.00 & 10 & \$ 275 \\\\\hline \$ 23.00 & 20 & \$ 435 \\\\\hline \$ 22.50 & 30 & \$ 610 \\ \hline \$ 22.00 & 40 & \$ 800 \\\\\hline \$ 21.60 & 50 & \$ 1,005 \\\\\hline \$ 21.20 & 60 & \$ 1,225 \\ \hline\end{array}$$
Jane and Bill are apprehended for a bank robbery. They are taken into separate rooms and questioned by the police about their involvement in the crime. The police tell them each that if they confess and turn the other person in, they will receive a lighter sentence. If they both confess, they will be each be sentenced to 30 years. If neither confesses, they will each receive a 20-year sentence. If only one confesses, the confessor will receive 15 years and the one who stayed silent will receive 35 years. Table 10.7 below represents the choices available to Jane and Bill. If Jane trusts Bill to stay silent, what should she do? If Jane thinks that Bill will confess, what should she do? Does Jane have a dominant strategy? Does Bill have a dominant strategy? \(\mathrm{A}=\) Confess; \(\mathrm{B}=\) Stay Silent. (Each results entry lists Jane's sentence first (in years), and Bill's sentence second.)
Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Firm A) is large and the other firm (Firm B) is small, as the prisoner's dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows. $$\begin{array}{l|l|l}\hline & \begin{array}{l}\text { Firm B colludes with Firm } \\\\\text { A }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { Firm B cheats by selling more } \\\\\text { output }\end{array} \\\\\hline \text { Firm A colludes with Firm B } & \begin{array}{l}\text { A gets } \$ 1,000, \text { B gets } \\\\\$ 100\end{array} & \text { A gets \$800, B gets \$200 } \\\\\hline \begin{array}{l}\text { Firm A cheats by selling more } \\ \text { output }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { A gets \$1,050, B gets } \\\\\$ 50\end{array} & \text { A gets \$500, B gets \$20 } \\\\\hline\end{array}$$ Assuming that both firms know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case?
When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that the cartel could stay together over the long term-that the incentives for individual members to cheat would become too strong. More than forty years later, OPEC still exists. Why do you think OPEC has been able to beat the odds and continue to collude? Hint: You may wish to consider non- economic reasons.
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