Chapter 10: Problem 8
How can a monopolistic competitor tell whether the price it is charging will cause the firm to earn profits or experience losses?
Chapter 10: Problem 8
How can a monopolistic competitor tell whether the price it is charging will cause the firm to earn profits or experience losses?
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Get started for freeSometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Firm A) is large and the other firm (Firm B) is small, as the prisoner's dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows. $$\begin{array}{l|l|l}\hline & \begin{array}{l}\text { Firm B colludes with Firm } \\\\\text { A }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { Firm B cheats by selling more } \\\\\text { output }\end{array} \\\\\hline \text { Firm A colludes with Firm B } & \begin{array}{l}\text { A gets } \$ 1,000, \text { B gets } \\\\\$ 100\end{array} & \text { A gets \$800, B gets \$200 } \\\\\hline \begin{array}{l}\text { Firm A cheats by selling more } \\ \text { output }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { A gets \$1,050, B gets } \\\\\$ 50\end{array} & \text { A gets \$500, B gets \$20 } \\\\\hline\end{array}$$ Assuming that both firms know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case?
Will the firms in an oligopoly act more like a monopoly or more like competitors? Briefly explain.
Is a monopolistically competitive firm productively efficient? Is it allocatively efficient? Why or why not?
What is the relationship between product differentiation and monopolistic competition?
Continuing with the scenario in question \(1,\) in the long run, the positive economic profits that the monopolistic competitor earns will attract a response either from existing firms in the industry or firms outside. As those firms capture the original firm's profit, what will happen to the original firm's profit-maximizing price and output levels?
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