Chapter 16: Problem 13
How can moral hazard lead to more costly insurance premiums than one was expected?
Chapter 16: Problem 13
How can moral hazard lead to more costly insurance premiums than one was expected?
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Get started for freeIn an insurance system, would you expect each person to receive in benefits pretty much what they pay in premiums or is it just that the average benefits paid will equal the average premiums paid?
Imagine that you can divide 50-year-old men into two groups: those who have a family history of cancer and those who do not. For the purposes of this example, say that \(20 \%\) of a group of 1,000 men have a family history of cancer, and these men have one chance in 50 of dying in the next year, while the other \(80 \%\) of men have one chance in 200 of dying in the next year. The insurance company is selling a policy that will pay \(\$ 100,000\) to the estate of anyone who dies in the next year. a. If the insurance company were selling life insurance separately to each group, what would be the actuarially fair premium for each group? b. If an insurance company were offering life insurance to the entire group, but could not find out about family cancer histories, what would be the actuarially fair premium for the group as a whole? c. What will happen to the insurance company if it tries to charge the actuarially fair premium to the group as a whole rather than to each group separately?
Define deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance.
How might adverse selection make it difficult for an insurance market to operate?
You are on the board of directors of a private high school, which is hiring new tenth-grade science teachers. As you think about hiring someone for a job, what are some mechanisms you might use to overcome the problem of imperfect information?
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