Chapter 12: Problem 32
Will a system of marketable permits work with thousands of firms? Why or why not?
Chapter 12: Problem 32
Will a system of marketable permits work with thousands of firms? Why or why not?
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Get started for freeWhat is a marketable permit and what incentive does it provide for a firm to account for external costs?
What is the difference between private costs and social costs?
As the extent of environmental protection expands, would you expect marginal costs of environmental protection to rise or fall? Why or why not?
Consider the case of global environmental problems that spill across international borders as a prisoner's dilemma of the sort studied in Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly. Say that there are two countries, A and B. Each country can choose whether to protect the environment, at a cost of \(10,\) or not to protect it, at a cost of zero. If one country decides to protect the environment, there is a benefit of \(16,\) but the benefit is divided equally between the two countries. If both countries decide to protect the environment, there is a benefit of \(32,\) which is divided equally between the two countries. a. In Table \(12.10,\) fill in the costs, benefits, and total payoffs to the countries of the following decisions. Explain why, without some international agreement, they are likely to end up with neither country acting to protect the environment.
How can high-income countries benefit from covering much of the cost of reducing pollution created by low-income countries?
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