Chapter 10: Q. 11 (page 283)
How does bank chartering reduce adverse selection problems? Does it always work?
Short Answer
By offering screening proposals to new banks, bank chartering eliminates adverse selection difficulties.
Chapter 10: Q. 11 (page 283)
How does bank chartering reduce adverse selection problems? Does it always work?
By offering screening proposals to new banks, bank chartering eliminates adverse selection difficulties.
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Get started for freeIn some countries, governments and bank authorities adopt policies that impose restrictions on asset holdings. Why do they do this?
How does bank chartering reduce adverse selection problems? Does it always work?
Why can government safety nets create both an adverse selection problem and a moral hazard problem?
Go to the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database, and find data on the number of commercial banks in the United States in each of the following categories: average assets less than \(100 million (US100NUM), average assets between \)100 million and \(300 million (US13NUM), average assets between \)300 million and \(1 billion (US31NUM), average assets between \)1 billion and \(15 billion (US115NUM), and average assets greater than \)15 billion (USG15NUM). Download the data into a spreadsheet. Calculate the percentage of banks in the smallest (less than \(100 million) and largest (greater than \)15 billion) categories, as a percentage of the total number of banks, for the most recent quarter of data available and for 1990:Q1. What has happened to the proportion of very large banks? What has happened to the proportion of very small banks? What does this say about the “too-big-to-fail” problem and moral hazard?
What are some of the limitations to the Basel and Basel 2 Accords? How does the Basel 3 Accord attempt to address these limitations?
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